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Abstract 
The Republic of Indonesia is a young democratic country which has enjoyed merely 
seventy years of its independence from colonialisation in 1945. Furthermore, a 
substantial part of those seventy years were dominated by a military-esque regime 
between the 1960s to 1998, which significantly affected the current political 
developments of Indonesia today. Nonetheless, Indonesia aims to be a welfare state, for 
which there is a strive to improve the standards of living of the Indonesian people. This 
paper seeks to analyse the progression of the Indonesian welfare state, especially 
considering the election of a new president in 2014 as well as the issuance and 
implementation of a new national social security system. In relation to such analysis, 
this paper also seeks to explain the social and economic relations in the process of the 
development of the Indonesian welfare state. 
 
  
Resumo 
A República da Indonésia é um país democrático jovem, que tem desfrutado de meros 
setenta anos de sua independência da colonização em 1945. Além disso, uma parte 
substancial desses setenta anos foram dominados por um regime militar entre os anos 
1960 a 1998, o que afetou significativamente a desenvolvimentos políticos actuais da 
Indonésia hoje. No entanto, Indonésia tem como objetivo ser um estado de bem-estar, 
para a qual existe um esforço para melhorar os padrões de vida do povo Indonésio. Este 
trabalho procura analisar a progressão do estado de bem-estar da Indonésia, 
especialmente considerando a eleição de um novo presidente em 2014, bem como a 
emissão e implementação de uma nova sistema nacional de seguridade social. Em 
relação a essa análise, este trabalho também procura explicar as relações sociais e 
econômicas no processo de desenvolvimento do estado de bem-estar da Indonésia. 
 
Key Words/Palavras-Chaves: Indonesia, welfare state/estado de bem-estar, social 
security/ seguridade social, macroeconomy/macroeconomia.  
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Introduction 
 
The concept of welfare states did not arise casually, nor is it now considered as a new 
concept. However, literature regarding welfare states in poor or developing countries 
are still rare. One of the main challenges to this proposal is the question of whether a 
welfare state exists or can exist in a poor or developing country. Nita Rudra raises a 
similar question whereby she challenges the notion that there is a convergence of 
developing countries, rendering them the same animal, without the capacities required 
to become a welfare state (Rudra, 2007).  
The other challenge to the existence of a welfare state in a poor or developing country is 
the role that the welfare state plays in such a country. Although it is known that the role 
of the welfare state is not merely insurance or guarantee of welfare (especially not only 
of the poor), it is also undeniable that this role cannot be discounted.  
We have been told that welfare states mostly exist in three forms (Esping-Andersen, 
1990): the Liberal; the Corporatist; and the Social-Democratic models. It is obvious 
from the elaborations by Esping-Andersen that he does not at all consider developing 
countries to fall into any of the above categories. However, if we take the words of 
Segura-Ubiergo, he prefers to broadly define the welfare state as the following: 
“[…] a repertoire of state-led policies aimed at securing a minimum 
of welfare to its citizens – that is, protecting them against the risks 
of unemployment, sickness, maternity, and old age – and providing 
an adequate accumulation of human capital through public 
investments in health and education.” (Segura-Ubiergo, 2007) 
Understanding the above definition, then a state which provides or aims to provide at 
least a minimum security of welfare to its citizens, can be considered as a welfare state, 
regardless of its economic and/or political abilities to do so. Herein lies a basis for the 
consideration of the existence of a welfare state in a developing country. It is 
understandable that studies of welfare states in developing countries have not really 
seen the light of day; social safety nets and systems of public investment in health and 
education are relatively weak in the developing world (Segura-Ubiergo, 2007). 
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However, this does not then imply that it is not worth considering that a welfare state 
may exist in a developing world. 
Within these conditions
1
, the author felt that a study of an Indonesian welfare state was 
necessary - especially in light of the implementation of a new social security system in 
Indonesia. This study shall seek to analyse the implementation of the JKN health-care 
system in Indonesia, observing it from the framework of various indicators accorded to 
a developing welfare state. Nonetheless, the implementation of the SJSN limits us to 
only study the implementation of healthcare systems. 
The first chapter shall focus more on showing the limitations of the traditional definition 
of a welfare state, especially in relation to developing nations. We shall attempt to 
delineate the components of a welfare state in itself. The aim is that by giving a clear 
framework definition of what constitutes a welfare state, we may be more receptive to 
the notion of developing welfare states.  
The second chapter shall discuss the development of the ‘welfare state’ in Indonesia 
through the structure of a retelling of a history of Indonesian social structures. It is 
hoped that a clear understanding of the Indonesian society since its formation as a 
nation state shall help also to understand whether there exists any components of a 
welfare state and how these elements were developed. 
The third chapter shall analyse country-specific information and data, specifically of 
Indonesia. Through this data analysis as well as an analysis of the components of a 
developmental welfare state mentioned in the preceding chapter, it is expected that we 
can then draw a map of the elements of a developing welfare state in Indonesia. We will 
then draw conclusions from the prior discussions and to determine what type of welfare 
state exists in Indonesia. This chapter shall also include some policy suggestions toward 
the improvement of the social security system in Indonesia. 
The methods used in this research includes a detailed literary analysis of scholarship 
pertaining to welfare states, specifically welfare states in developing countries. We shall 
also analyse primary, secondary and tertiary data regarding the conditions of the social 
security system in Indonesia, drawing slight comparisons with other countries as to the 
implementation of universal health care. The approach focuses more on the theoretical 
                                                 
1
 Interestingly, the Indonesian people themselves perceive Indonesia as a welfare state based on the 
Pancasila (supposed national ideology). See (Aspinall, 2015). 
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and data analysis, as opposed to manipulation and re-calculation of existing statistics 
from reliable sources. This study shall include the analysis of various social and 
macroeconomic policies pertaining to the Indonesian recently ‘revolutionised’ social 
security system.  
Figure 1 – The “Five I’s” of Social Policy 
 
Source: Ian Gough (2008) 
 
In this research, we shall also use the inspirations of what is a textbook policy making 
process as initially introduced by Easton (1965) and Hill (2003), which uses the “Five 
Is”: Industrialisation, Interests, Institutions, Ideas and International supra-state 
influences. (Gough, 2008). We shall explain it through a historical time series context in 
order to understand the developments of these “Five I’s” in correlation with Indonesia. 
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Chapter I 
 
Given the complexity of the subject, I shall firstly formulate the proposed idea of a 
developing welfare state prior to an exploration of the type of welfare state that exists in 
Indonesia. Current literature, bound mostly by the Esping-Andersen models, focuses on 
the welfare states in Europe. It is by no means a misguided notion as welfare states were 
conceived in Europe anyways; however, it also sets limitations as to the understanding 
of the welfare state itself. Hence, should we not also pursue the question of welfare 
states in developing nations? Ignacy Sachs, for example, has raised a similar question as 
early as 1971 (Sachs, 1971), decades before the Esping-Andersen models were 
elucidated.  
However, in order to understand and deconstruct the conventional markers of a welfare 
state, it is important to firstly understand the traditional definitions of the welfare state. 
These mainly focus on the welfare state models presented in Western and Northern 
Europe, citing the Esping-Andersen models. Once we have established the usual ‘norm’ 
of the welfare state, we shall then move to the definitions when applied to a developing 
country – the developmental welfare state. 
A. Traditional Definitions of the Welfare State 
In a bid to somehow break the ‘norms’ of what can constitute as a welfare state, we 
must firstly discover a rough definition of such. Of course, as no state is ever structured 
in exactly the same way, it will be difficult to determine what elements, when 
combined, constitute as a welfare state. Many scholars have disagreed on a clear 
standard of definition of welfare state. Perhaps it is even futile to attempt to define what 
a welfare state really is. However, in this study we shall aim to somehow provide a sort 
of framework definition as our guide.  
The definition of a welfare state may vary from defining the role of the state in a 
welfare state to the initiator of socio-political and political economy policies 
implemented in the state. Earlier scholarship that attempted to define a welfare state 
reviews the amount of public expenditure is spent on welfare; yet some even broaden 
the definitions to the role of religion and family (Esping-Andersen, 1990).  
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However, before we enter into the discussion on what can be included as a welfare state, 
we must understand the “basic” references. We shall analyse the proposed concepts of 
the welfare state in its most traditional sense, as we have set out below. 
1. The Esping-Andersen Models 
Departing from the theories set forth by Richard Titmuss in 1958, where Titmuss 
proposed three types of welfare regimes (the ‘residual’, the ‘functional’ and the 
‘institutional-redistributive’ (Titmuss, 1958), Esping-Andersen then introduced his three 
concepts.  
Esping-Andersen explained that welfare regimes can be clustered according to the 
degrees of ‘de-commodification’, ‘system of stratification’ and ‘public-private mix’. He 
maintained that if this analysis were to be applied to a variety of countries, then it would 
fall into one of the three regimes: the ‘liberal’, the ‘corporatist’ and the ‘social 
democratic’. 
i. The ‘Liberal’ 
Citing the author, the ‘liberal’ welfare state is a state “in which means-tested assistance, 
modest universal transfers, or modest social insurance plans predominate” (Esping-
Andersen, 1990). The countries that fall into this lump include the United States, 
Canada and Australia. In these countries, the de-commodification movement was not so 
strong, bearing in mind that there is much dependence on the fluctuations of the market 
and the tendency to believe that welfare is in correlation with the productivity of the 
individual. Welfare assistance in these countries are severely circumscribed by 
traditional, liberal work-ethic norms: where the limits of welfare equal to the marginal 
propensity to opt for welfare instead of work (Esping-Andersen, 1990). It may be seen 
here that there is an implicit suggestion that those who rely on welfare assistance are 
those who choose to rely on welfare, despite likely having the other choice to work. 
From this view, the recipients of welfare are generally equally poor, as the welfare 
benefits they receive are modest. This does not even account for the lack of somewhat 
public health-care assistance which, for example, in the United States was only recently 
introduced via ObamaCare (Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act or ‘PPACA’). 
There is a stronger reliance on private welfare providers as this is generally encouraged 
by the governments through, for example, some types of subsidies. 
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ii. The ‘Corporatist’ 
Although the corporatist models are not plagued with the obsessions of the liberal 
countries, there still exists a tendency of categorisation of persons. The emphasis here 
lies more on the differences of social class and standing rather than the stigma of 
lethargy imposed upon welfare beneficiaries. De-commodification and market 
efficiency has never been a strong point of debate. However, despite the state being 
ready to provide welfare in place of private welfare providers, due to its determination 
in upholding status differences, its redistributive impact is negligible (Esping-Andersen, 
1990).  
Nonetheless, it is observable that much of the policies in this regime are influenced by 
the more traditional family values generally encouraged by the Church. The benefits 
usually exclude non-working wives and instead encourage motherhood (Esping-
Andersen, 1990). With this type of regime, there is strong emphasis in the roles of the 
family; the state only interfering and coming into play once the family is unable or 
unwilling to fulfil its ‘obligations’. The countries included in this regime are Austria, 
France, Germany, and Italy (Esping-Andersen, 1990). 
This regime, of course, could hardly be implemented in a society where the likelihood 
of a family having sufficient resources to not only take care of itself but also its 
branches (usually referring to the nuclear family ties), are very slim. The role of the 
state is diminished to being a safety net provider of welfare once the principal role of 
the family has failed. The bulk of the burden, therefore, lies more on the family who is 
expected to be able to gain access to sufficient resources in order to ensure that it does 
not become an end of itself. 
iii. The ‘Social-Democratic’ 
According to Esping-Andersen, this regime consists of countries “[…] in which 
principles of universalism and de-commodification of social rights were extended also 
to the new middle classes”, and in which “social democracy was clearly the dominant 
force behind social reform.” (Esping-Andersen, 1990). This resulted in a state which 
pursued to provide high levels of welfare for its citizens, and not merely playing the 
safety net or mere provider of minimum needs.  
Of course, one of the challenges here is the ambitious attempt to fulfil the rigor of the 
“discriminating tastes of the middle class”, of whom expect not the mere means of 
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survival but a welfare worth their time and effort. Another feature of this regime is that 
equality must be provided by guaranteeing the full participation of workers in the 
quality of right enjoyed by the ‘better-offs’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The idea, then, is 
not for the state to only be the safety net once the roles of the family fails or even once 
the person is struck by lethargy, but for the state to take an active part in the provision 
of a good level of living for its citizens. The closest to this regime is, of course, the 
Scandinavian countries, which have fewer burdens in terms of population and yet have 
adequate resources to provide quality welfare. 
Clearly, this type of model could not fit with a state that has a large population but 
hardly enough resources to fulfil its basic needs, as is common in developing countries. 
The question then remains, what kind of welfare states do developing countries have, 
considering their limitations, in terms of: financing; low income per capita; 
demographics; migration and infrastructure specifications, as well as political power 
relations? 
The following section shall discuss ‘unconventional’ welfare states which have emerged 
in East Asia and Latin America.  
 
B. The Limits of Traditional Welfare State Models – the Developing 
Welfare State 
As may be seen in the above traditional definitions of the welfare state, it is plain to see 
that many of the categories cannot be perfectly fitted with the conditions of a 
developing country. However, this does not mean that the welfare state cannot exist in a 
developing state. 
Considering the multiple facets of the welfare state, we shall draw some limitations as 
to what we will analyse as a definition of a developing welfare state. Setting aside the 
initiators of the policies implemented in a state, we shall focus on the components of the 
policies itself. In other words, we shall turn to the simple question of what ‘facilities’ 
the state provides for its citizens in terms of welfare. The provision of a basic modicum 
of welfare for the citizens of a nation as an obligation of the state can be considered as a 
definition of the welfare state in its most basic form. Nonetheless, it still holds true that 
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regardless of the initiator of welfare-leaning policies, such policies are still put in place 
and that they are in effect. 
A focus on budgetary proportions of state expenditure may err when dissected – an 
example is the Austrian case where a large proportion of its budget was spent on already 
privileged civil servants (Esping-Andersen, 1990). This fragile way of analysing the 
welfare state misses the essence that a welfare state should aim to provide welfare to all 
of its citizens, instead of a select few.  
There is also the proposal that in a welfare state, states shall act as a safety net and shall 
only enter the foray once the role of the family or the society fails as in the 
aforementioned corporatist models (Esping-Andersen, 1990). This will only work where 
there is a high probability for dependence upon familial ties. However, the question 
remains if there no possibility of dependence on family members, whether due to social 
or even financial infeasibility. Disregarding the role that the family has as a point of 
dependence clearly puts more burden on the role of the state to step in and somehow 
‘guarantee’ the welfare of its citizens, at least for the most basic of needs such as 
healthcare and education. 
We must bear in mind, however, that developing countries are not privy to resources to 
fulfil the demands of a social-democratic welfare state model. The following examples 
explain the different forms of welfare state in East Asia and Latin America. 
1. The East-Asian Developmental Welfare State Models 
Huck-ju Kwon, as part of a study by the United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development (UNRISD) on ‘Social Policy in a Development Context’, mentioned that 
the welfare state can refer to “[…] a set of social policies and institutions that aim to 
protect citizens from social contingencies, poverty and illness, but does not necessarily 
mean that the optimum level of well-being of citizens is achieved nor that all citizens 
have access to social benefits” (Kwon, 2005a).  
In this case, Kwon mentioned that the Asian countries, mostly the Asian Tigers, were 
also more focused on economic growth rather than social welfare, hence the term 
‘developmental’ is used. This is apparent in the initial stages of the Asian welfare state, 
where the welfare state was “[…] composed predominantly of social insurance 
programmes for industrial workers, in which people were required to pay contributions 
before having any entitlement to social benefits. As a result only selected groups of 
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people had access to social protection, […]” (Kwon, 2005a). The evolution of the East 
Asian welfare states, as in many other welfare states, are very much affected by the 
changes in their socio-economic structures – for example, through the process of 
democratisation and industrialisation. East Asian nations which are members of the 
Commonwealth, for example, such as Singapore, are very much influenced by nation-
building efforts. He then moves to divide the welfare states in East Asia can be 
categorised into two strands of ‘developmentalism’:  
1. The ‘selective welfare developmentalism’; and 
2. The ‘inclusive welfare developmentalism’. 
Kwon highlighted that some of these states tended to avoid the demand for universal 
entitlement and discourage dependence on the state, by enforcing rules which regulated 
the payment of contributions for social benefits by companies and their employees, in 
which the social programmes were operated by quasi-governmental agencies (Kwon, 
2005a).  
However, these regimes suffered greatly when it was put to test by the Asian Economic 
Crisis in 1997-1998. Many of the countries that implemented these types of social 
policies relied on strong economic growth and low unemployment. Korea, for example, 
was hit very hard as its system relied on the assumption that there is full employment. 
Hence, the policies in place at that time relied mainly on the assumption that almost 
everyone was able to contribute to their own welfare; and similar with Esping-
Andersen’s corporatist model, those who were unemployed were assumed to have their 
families or their savings to fall back on (Kwon, 2005a).  
These types of welfare states are categorised by Kwon as countries adhering to 
‘selective welfare developmentalism’. He viewed that this type of developmentalism 
followed the Bismarckian model in 1880s Germany where social policy was not an 
instrument of improvement of welfare per se, but as an auxiliary instrument to 
economic and political objectives (Kwon, 2005b). According to the author, the earlier 
stages of the Korean welfare state, especially before the Asian Financial Crisis (“AFC”), 
had the characteristics in compliance with this model. That is, he refers to the narrow 
risk-pooling within certain social categories (hence selective) and that the major social 
policy initiatives were motivated by political justification of an authoritarian regime. 
This meant that medical insurance was focused on the public officials, private school 
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teachers or even only workers of large companies (companies which have more than 
500 employees, for example).
2
 Only after the crisis had passed did Korea implement the 
Minimum Living Standard Guarantee which was introduced in 2000. This program is 
set to give benefits as a social right to those with income below the poverty line without 
a prior family and demographic test (Kwon, 2005b).
3
 
Of course, this selective nature led to many social problems such as socioeconomic 
inequality and low capacity to protect the whole population, social instability, lack of 
social protection when it is actually more necessary, especially in crisis situations. 
According to Kwon the share of distribution through social policies went to high-
income earners, leaving the vulnerable people in society to suffer. This also led to not 
only an amplification of their already difficult situation but also the emergence of 
stigmatization due to their non-inclusion in the welfare state (Kwon, 2005a). 
Kwon then moved to explain that the Nordic and Scandinavian countries  in the 1930s 
to the 1970s (as in the case of Esping-Andersen’s social-democratic model), were more 
inclusive in nature, which not only aimed to provide income maintenance but also to 
equip its citizens with skills to improve their standard of living. In Asia, he asserts that 
Japan, and later Korea, are arriving into this phase (Kwon, 2005a). This is what he 
names as the second strand which is the ‘inclusive welfare developmentalism’.  
However, in East Asian nations, inclusive welfare developmentalism did not arise solely 
on its own. Many states started off with selective welfare developmentalism prior to 
social reforms which led to more inclusive social policies. In Taiwan, for example, 
initial health insurance was initiated in the 1950s and was developed until the early 
1980s under an authoritarian developmental state where beneficiaries were selected on 
their strategic importance to the regime. It was only after the democratisation in the late 
1980s that there was a transition to a more universal form of protection (Wong, 2005).  
 
                                                 
2
 See full History of Korean Health Insurance System in 
http://www.nhic.or.kr/static/html/wbd/g/a/wbdga0203.html accessed on 26 May 2015. 
3
 Prior to this program, the people who were considered of working age (15 to 59) were automatically 
considered as ineligible (demographically eliminated) and the elderly whose children had incomes higher 
than the poverty line were also disallowed (reliance on family relations). See (Kwon, 2005b).  
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2. The Latin American Welfare States 
The welfare states in Latin American countries initially followed the lines set in the 
European models (Segura-Ubiergo, 2007). The welfare state in Latin American 
countries can be divided into two groups. The first, consisting of Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Uruguay and Costa Rica – all of which have relatively well-developed welfare 
states with a high range of GDP for social expenditures (Segura-Ubiergo, 2007); the 
second, including less developed welfare states such as Bolivia, Dominican Republic, 
El Salvador, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela, with lower 
social expenditures on GDP (Segura-Ubiergo, 2007). 
Segura-Ubiergo presented data which suggested that the higher developed welfare states 
in Latin America had expenditures (relatively, as compared with the share of the GDP, 
however the GDP per capita itself is much lower than the GDP per capita in developed 
countries; while the benefits or the expenditure per capita is actually much lower in 
Latin America) almost equal to those of the Nordic expenditures, while the least 
developed welfare states in Latin America are equal to those of the Philippines or 
Indonesia (Segura-Ubiergo, 2007). 
However, these countries came from different backgrounds and result in different typed 
of welfare states. The Brazilian welfare state, for example, only fully emerged under the 
an authoritarian regime in the 1970s (Draibe, 2002). This ‘social welfare state’ (Estado 
de Bem Estar Social) can be divided into three different groups, even though they are 
not distinctly separated in terms of management and financing. Health care is treated as 
a separate category; ‘welfare programs’ include facilities such as food and day-care 
policies; and ‘social security’ is used when referring to retirement or pension benefits 
(Draibe, 2002).  
The initial focus of the Brazilian welfare state was the development of pension systems 
in the 1940s, followed by a public health system in 1960s. These early developments 
were more selective in terms of the selection of beneficiaries whereby these benefits 
were not universally applied, heterogeneous in terms of the benefits that were 
distributed and fragmented in terms of management. (Draibe, 2002). The author argues 
that these developments were sparked by the reform of the state into a New State 
(Estado Novo) wherein it allows a more centralised and concentrated power, endowing 
the state with mechanisms that allowed national, as opposed to regional, policies 
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(Draibe, 2002).  It was in 1988, after the fall of the authoritarian regime and the 
introduction of the New Constitution (the “Constituição Cidadã”), that the Brazilian 
welfare state started to move forward with more universal forms of protection, with the 
introduction of the Sistema Unificado de Saúde (the Unified Health System, or “SUS”).  
Draibe provides that the first cycle of reforms were brought in around 1985 with the end 
of the dictatorship period and introduction of democratization. The next cycle of 
reforms occurred due to a conservative stagnation, which brought a new wave of 
reforms. Nonetheless, these reforms were still held under neo-liberal governments 
which did not allow maximum reform.  
According to Segura-Ubiergo, there are two main paths which can be used to define the 
Latin American welfare state: (i) with or without favourable economic conditions; and 
(ii) the existence of favourable political conditions (democracy and left-labour power) 
(Segura-Ubiergo, 2007). In his book, he argues that the more developed welfare states 
such as Argentina, Brazil, and Chile had the stronger favourable economic and political 
conditions which allowed for a more comprehensive welfare state.  
As also apparent in the East-Asian welfare state models as well as the Esping-Andersen 
models, we can see that there is a binding thread where political and economic 
conditions become the determinant factors of the complexity of a welfare state. It is 
using these arguments that we shall aim to explain the Indonesian welfare state. 
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Chapter II 
 
Development of the State and Welfare in Indonesia 
In this study, we shall take the Republic of Indonesia as a case in point. The Republic of 
Indonesia is an archipelago which lies in the region of South-East Asia. It straddles the 
equator and lies between mainland Asia and Australia, also between the Pacific and 
Indian Oceans. With a population of approximately 240 million persons and a GDP per 
capita of approximately US$ 3,475
4
 (World Bank, 2015) Indonesia is one of the largest 
economies in the Asia-Pacific region. However, most of the Indonesian labour force 
greatly participates in the informal economy, as stated by the ILO, in 2009 
approximately 62% of the Indonesian labour force are employed in the informal 
economy, not including those who work in the agricultural sector.
5
 The following table 
and diagram shows the population of Indonesia as of the 2010 census, divided by age 
groups and sex. 
Table 1 – General Population6 
Age Group Male Female Total 
0 – 4 11,662,369 11,016,333 22,678,702 
5 – 9 11,974,094 11,279,386 23,253,480 
10 – 14 11,662,417 11,008,664 22,671,081 
15 – 19 10,614,306 10,266,428 20,880,734 
20 – 24 9,887,713 10,003,920 19,891,633 
25 – 29 10,631,311 10,679,132 21,310,443 
30 – 34 9,949,357 9,881,328 19,830,685 
35 – 39 9,337,517 9,167,614 18,505,131 
40 – 44 8,322,712 8,202,140 16,524,852 
45 – 49 7,032,740 7,008,242 14,040,982 
50 – 54 5,865,997 5,695,324 11,561,321 
55 – 59 4,400,316 4,048,254 8,448,570 
60 – 64 2,927,191 3,131,570 6,058,761 
65 – 69 2,225,133 2,468,898 4,694,031 
70 – 74 1,531,459 1,924,872 3,456,331 
75 – 79 842,344 1,135,561 1,977,905 
80 – 84 481,462 661,708 1,143,170 
85 – 89 182,432 255,529 437,961 
90 – 94 63,948 106,951 170,899 
95+ 36,095 68,559 104,654 
Total 119,630,913 118,010,413 237,641,326 
                                                 
4
 See World Bank Data, retreived from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD accessed 
on 10 June 2014. 
5
 See Key Indicators of Labour Market program by the International Labour Organization, accessed 10 
July 2014. 
6
 See Penduduk Indonesia Hasil SP 2010, Badan Pusat Statistik Indonesia. 2013. 
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Figure 2 – The Indonesian Population Pyramid 
 
Considering the size of the Indonesian population and that the significant bulk of it is at 
the productive age, the labour force participation rate in Indonesia is still quite low, with 
just over half of the population engaged in some sort of employment during a certain 
period in a year. The following tables show the development of the labour force over a 
period of approximately 12 years in Indonesia – taken during the time of the AFC (and 
the fall of Soeharto in 1998) as well as the time of the global financial crisis in 2008. 
Table 2 – Labour Force Participation Rate 
Year Labour force 
('000) 
Population 
('000) 
Population 
Growth Rate 
(%) 
Labour force 
participation rate (%) 
1998 92,734.898 141,971.703 2% 65.3 
1999 95,793.203 141,096.500 1% 67.9 
2008 111,947.297 166,640.906 1% 67.2 
2009 113,833.297 169,328.203 1% 67.2 
2010 116,527.5 172,070.297 1% 67.7 
Source – ILO Database 2013 and World Development Indicators 2015 
Regardless of the growth rate, it can be seen that the proportion of the Indonesian 
population engaged in employment has not drastically risen nor fallen. We see that there 
is a steady increase, with slight drops as aftershocks of the global financial crisis in 
2008 – improving only marginally in 2010. Nonetheless, even less than this amount of 
the population were covered by the social security system active at those times as the 
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social security system of that era merely covered the formal workers, mainly civil 
servants and those engaged by the military, but also including workers who were 
formally contracted in the private sector.  
Table 3 – Unemployment Rate 
Year Labour force ('000) Unemployed ('000) Unemployment rate (%) 
1998 92,734.938 5,062.5 5.5 
1999 95,793.156 6,030.3 6.3 
2008 111,947.297 9,394.5 8.4 
2009 113,833.297 8,962.617 7.9 
2010 116,527.5 8,319.779 7.1 
Source – ILO Database 2013 
The ILO defines that those who are unemployed are those who are not currently 
employed but are still actively seeking employment. It is clear from the above table that 
there is a steady increase in unemployment in Indonesia, struck heavily still during the 
global financial crisis. These are the people that are most likely to not be covered by any 
social insurance as part of the social security regime active at that time. 
Table 4 – Inactivity Rate 
Year Population ('000) Inactive Population ('000) Inactivity rate (%) 
1998 138,709.906 48,058.219 34.6 
1999 141,898.906 45,926.801 32.4 
2008 163,912.297 52,961.398 32.3 
2009 166,314.797 53,408.199 32.1 
2010 168,884.906 54,394.609 32.2 
Source – ILO Database 2013 
From the above table, we may assume that the people included in this category do not 
contribute actively to the economy. The ILO source defines the inactivity rate as the 
measure of the proportion of the country’s working-age population that is not engaged 
actively in the labour market, either by working or looking for work. As such it may be 
possible that a large number of these people are still within the mandatory school age 
(until approximately 18 years of age), in the university age (approximately until the age 
of 25), or are over the Indonesian pension age (in Indonesia the pension age is 55 years 
of age for the private sector, 58 to 60 in the public sector); but are still included as part 
of the labour force. Considering the above, we see that the rate of inactivity is fairly 
stable with no significant fluctuations, whether during periods of ‘stability’ or periods of 
crisis. Part of this population may be covered by the social security regimes offered at 
18 
 
 
 
that time, as many may have been the spouse or children of a person who was entitled to 
social security coverage which includes their immediate family (such as civil servants 
and persons employed by the military). 
Due to the particular way in which social structures developed in Indonesia, it is 
important to understand the history and conditions of Indonesia itself, in order to further 
understand the role that Indonesian social structures play in the development of social 
protection. We shall give an explanation of the historical developments of Indonesia 
starting from the colonial times, up to the current governmental situation. It is especially 
important to understand the scheme of power during the colonial times and the times of 
the dictatorship as this has affected - and may explain the motives behind - many of 
Indonesia’s current policies and its treatment of labour workers, including the 
subsequent labour movements. These times have also affected the social security 
regimes that have been implemented in Indonesia throughout the years. This part of the 
research shall take the structure of a historical recount of the political struggles in 
Indonesia. 
1. The Rise of Indonesia as a Nation State 
In this section, we shall attempt to explain the rise of the Republic of Indonesia as a 
nation-state. This means that we shall provide an account of the main occurrences in 
Indonesia, especially starting from the colonisation of the Dutch, through the occupation 
of the Japanese during the World War II – culminating in the rise of the Indonesian 
State under Soekarno. 
i. European Colonisation 
A combination of several factors triggered the Dutch expedition to Indonesia. In 1595, 
Jan Hyugen van Linschoten, a Dutch man employed by the Portuguese, published the 
Itenerario near Oost ofte Portugaels Indien (the ‘Itinerary to the East, or Portuguese 
Indies’), containing maps and detailed descriptions of the Portuguese discoveries 
(Brown, 2003). The Portuguese, who originally guarded closely their ‘secret’ of the 
‘spice islands’, were basically exposed to the Dutch by the publishing of Linschoten’s 
book. The Dutch were also under immense political pressure to establish trading routes 
and trade of spices. In 1595, the first Dutch expedition to Indonesia set sail led by 
Cornelis de Houtman. 
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The 1600s were mainly filled with power struggles between the Vereenigde Oost-
Indische Compagnie (the Dutch East-Indies Company or the ‘VOC’) Dutch, the 
Portuguese, the Spanish and the English. They fought over the ports of trade and the 
rights to purchase spices from various islands in Indonesia. Maluku, Makassar, Ambon 
and Banten were especially fought for. Amidst these fights between the Europeans, the 
Indonesian rulers were also caught in the crosshairs. The VOC and Dutch government, 
who were the dominant power at that time, established many policies, including the 
devide et impera (the ‘divide and rule’) policy which were used to manipulate the small 
kingdoms around the main ports and spice origins. 
The implementation of policies such as the cultuurstelsel (cultivation policy), created by 
Johanes van den Bosch, forced Javanese villages to pay a land tax of approximately 
40% of their crops (usually rice) to the Dutch government. The crops produced from 
this project were exported by the Nederlandsche Handel Maatschappij. Despite the 
rebellions fought by Indonesians against this system (such as strikes and sabotage of 
sugar cane fields), the Dutch still effectively implemented this cultivation policy. 
Through this system, the Dutch were able to repay their debts and to accumulate enough 
profit to maintain both the Indonesian outposts and also the Dutch economy in the 
Netherlands (Brown, 2003). 
The islands in the eastern part of Indonesia still faced many power struggles between 
the Dutch and the Portuguese, with the Dutch maintaining firm hold over most of the 
areas while the Portuguese maintained a firm hold over East Timor. The British were 
taking over some parts of western Indonesia, including Padang which was a substantial 
outpost of the VOC. Padang fell into British hands during the time that Raffles was 
appointed as Lieutenant-General of the EIC in 1819 (Brown, 2003). 
For the Indonesians themselves, this did not offer much in terms of welfare; many 
people were still employed in the rural areas, most were forced to work under harsh 
conditions which did not provide them with any protection. As the concept of the ‘state’ 
of Indonesia was not yet established during these times, many of the people still relied 
on familial protection – in the case that the family was not able to provide these forms 
of protection, the local village government was ‘held responsible’. Although, of course, 
at these times the local governments consisted of wealthy land-owners or those who are 
related to the royal families (the dukes and duchesses, if you will), hence many of them 
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were unable to sympathise with the sufferings of the people. Even then, the protection 
was organised in a more communal or religious form, where there is no legal obligation 
to provide aid. 
Entering the 20
th
 century, the Dutch drastically changed their policies on Indonesia: they 
focused on Indonesian welfare. At least, they claim to do so. The changes in policy were 
so drastic that one simply ‘cannot understand 20th century Indonesia without it’ 
(Ricklefs, 2001). This was partially triggered by the publishing of Max Havelaar in 
1860s which basically exposed the level of exploitation in Indonesia, though the author 
(a Dutch using the pseudonym Multatuli) drew a nation of coffee traders, of which Java 
at that time supplied for three quarters of the global supply of coffee
7
. In 1899, a Dutch 
lawyer named van Deventer published an article entitled ‘Een Eereschuld’ or ‘A Debt 
of Honour’ where he argued that the Dutch owed the Indonesians a substantial amount 
of debt (not only nominal material debt) for all the exploitation of riches that has 
occurred in Indonesia. It is during this period that the Dutch introduced the ‘Ethical 
Policy’ in Indonesia. Although this may seem like a humanitarian move, the motive 
behind it in the end was more capitalistic. Instead of seeing Indonesia merely as the 
producers of tradable goods, the Dutch began to see Indonesia as a potential market. In 
order to gain maximum advantage of this market, the Dutch had to raise the living 
standards of Indonesians so that they are able to afford goods as well. Nonetheless, this 
started a welfare regime in Indonesia. 
This led to many infrastructure projects, including the expansion of tram and railways. 
By 1930s there were 7425 km worth of tram and railways. Agricultural projects such as 
the irrigation of the Sala river valley in Java were attempted. These were the basic 
foundations of the Ethical Policy of the Dutch in an attempt to raise the welfare of the 
Indonesians. However, Java, being the main island of Indonesia at that time, was 
suffering from overpopulation. Many people from the outer islands went to Java seeking 
employment, mostly ended up working as contract labourers for the Dutch. 
Approximately 34.4 million people were living in Java and nearby Madura by the 
1930s. This accounted for more than 70% of the Indonesian population at that moment. 
Hence, despite the attempts of the Dutch to increase welfare, Java suffered a major food 
crisis which persisted until about 1936. 
                                                 
7
 See Sejarah Indonesia: a Historical Glimpse , available at http://www.indo.com/indonesia/history.html , 
accessed on 6 December 2014. 
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The Dutch also expended a large amount of funds for public health projects such as 
immunisation and anti-malaria campaigns. Between 1900 and 1930, the Dutch nearly 
decupled their spending on public health. Nevertheless, this did not amount to much 
considering the amount of abject poverty in Indonesia, especially on the island of Java. 
The need for doctors, as well as the necessity of educating Indonesians, led to the 
establishment of the School tot opleiding van inlandsche artsen or widely known as the 
“STOVIA”. The STOVIA was a school that was established to train doctors. The school 
was open to Indonesians, but were nonetheless too expensive to be accessible to the 
average Indonesians. It is unfortunate that merely the wealthy and elite Indonesians 
were able to attend this school. However, this also seems to be in line with the Dutch 
agenda whereby they were not willing to have the entire population to be so well 
educated that they will understand state functions and good governance.  
Other schools such as the MULO (Meer uitgebreid lager onderwijs; a sort of junior 
high) schools were created in 1914 for upper-class Indonesians, Chinese and Europeans 
who had finished their respective primary schools. In 1919 AMS (Algemeene 
middelbare scholen, General middle schools) were established to carry pupils to 
university entrance level. However, it was only in 1920 that university-level education 
was open for Indonesians who did not undergo European education. The Technische 
Hoogeschool (technical college) was opened at Bandung in 1920. In 1924 a 
Rechtshoogeschool (law college) was opened in Batavia (modern-day Jakarta), and in 
1927 the STOVIA, also in Batavia, was turned into the Geneeskundige Hoogeschool 
(medical college).
8
 
Interestingly, there was already movement for women’s education during this period. 
The movement is more famously known to have been driven by Raden Ajeng Kartini – 
a daughter of the bupati of Jepara who was known to voice the need for women to also 
be educated. The most famous of her ‘works’ were the letters that she wrote to the wife 
of the Dutch official in charge of education (J.H. Abendanon – who was in favour of 
elitist-style education). These letters came to be known as Door Duisternis Tot Licht 
(‘From Darkness Comes the Light’ or ‘Dari Gelap Terbitlah Terang’). Although this 
did not receive much attention in Indonesia, there was movement in the Netherlands 
                                                 
8
 See Ricklefs, 2001. In truth, many other schools were also established as part of the Dutch attempt to 
improve so-called welfare, however, STOVIA was one of the most significant in the sense that it also 
aided the Dutch to provide medical doctors which was (and still is) a necessary tool to improve the living 
conditions in Indonesia. 
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called the Kartini Funds which aimed to teach Dutch to Javanese women (Ricklefs, 
2001)
9
. 
Not only did the Dutch attempt to raise the welfare of the Indonesians, they also 
adopted policies which ‘allowed’ the ‘indigenous’ Indonesians to participate in the 
government. They implemented the ‘Village Regulation’ in 1906, which (Ricklefs, 
2001): 
“aimed to increase democratic popular involvement in village 
affairs, to increase social cohesion, and to allow the Dutch Resident 
and Controleur, in conjunction with the village headman, to direct 
the village towards necessary welfare measures”. 
Without doubt, these attempts failed miserably. The Dutch were never really able to 
(nor did they ever really attempt to) see the Indonesians as equals; they still continued to 
be heavy handed in their dealings with Indonesians. 
However, in 1918, the Dutch established the Volksraad (People’s Council) which 
consisted of a mixture of Indonesians and Dutch persons. The Volksraad was initially 
established as a council which must be consulted with matters of finance but in practice, 
especially with the growing number of Indonesian members, the Volksraad became a 
sort of pro-Indonesia government body. The Dutch, seeing this threat, then implemented 
the staatsinrichting (constitution) in 1925 which limited the powers of the Volksraad. 
Several advisory councils similar to the Volksraad were established through the 1922 
bestuurhervormingwet (government council law) which included the division of 
Indonesia into several large regions with representatives (mostly bupatis) from each 
large region. 
Regardless of the seemingly powerful position the VOC held over the whole 
archipelago, it is clear that the company could not have done it without the cooperation 
of the locals. Many battles were won due to the participation of local leaders who 
thought it more beneficial to side with the Dutch than to try to maintain sovereignty; 
whether it was due to inferior resources or due to feelings of animosity towards other 
kingdoms. During this time, there was no sense of unity among the Indonesians (Brown, 
2003). 
                                                 
9
 See Ricklefs, 2001. This is significant in the sense that the traditional role of women in the Indonesian 
society was already starting to break even during the Dutch colonisation. 
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The revolutionary spark really started in the period after 1909 where there was a burst 
of organisations such as the Budi Utomo, the Sarekat Islam and other organisations. The 
following is an excerpt of a text describing the burst of organisations (Ricklefs, 2001): 
“[…] Students at STOVIA in Batavia, where Budi Utomo was born 
in 1908, also produced several other of these new organisations, 
including Tri Koro Dharmo (1915) which in 1918 became Jong 
Java (Young Java), Jong Sumatranen Bond (Young Sumatrans 
Union, 1917), the Studerenden Vereeniging Minahasa (Minahasan 
Study Union, 1918) and Jong Ambon (Young Ambon, 1918). Other 
such organisations included Sarekat Ambon (Ambonese Union, 
1920) and Pasundan (Land of the Sundanese, 1914), which was 
meant to be a sort of Budi Utomo for Sundanese. In 1921 Rotinese 
and Savunese established Timorsch Verbond (Timorese Alliance) to 
defend the interests of the peoples of Timor. Kaum Betawi (The 
People of Batavia, 1923) promoted the claims of the ‘original’ 
Indonesian citizens of Batavia; Pakempalan Politik Katolik Jawi 
(Political Association of Javanese Catholics, 1925) served the 
interests of that minority group. These and many other groups 
reflected the new enthusiasm for organisation, but also the 
continuing strength of ethnic and communal identities. The concept 
of an all-Indonesian identity had as yet hardly any following at all.” 
Trade unions were also introduced around this period. In 1908, the Vereeniging voor 
Spoor-en Tramweg Personeel (the ‘Union for Railway and Tram Workers’ or VSTP) 
was established; membership was open to Indonesian employees on an equal footing 
with Europeans from the beginning (Ricklefs, 2001). Other trade unions such as the 
trade unions for teachers, government pawnshop employees and public works 
employees were also established. The Indonesian Workers’ Union (Sarekat Kaum 
Buruh Indonesia) did not emerge until 1928. 
Even leftist parties started emerging in this period. In 1913, H. J. F. M. Sneevliet arrived 
in Indonesia. He had begun his career as a Catholic mystic but had then turned to social-
democratic revolutionary ideas and trade union activism. In 1914 he founded the 
Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereeniging (the ‘Indies Social-Democratic 
Association’ or ISDV) in Surabaya (Ricklefs, 2001). In 1920, under majority 
Indonesian rule, it changed its name to Perserikatan Kommunist di India (Communist 
Association in the Indies); it then evolved into the infamous Partai Komunis Indonesia 
(Indonesian Communist Party) in 1924. 
The fate of the trade unions and the leftist party intertwined when a union leader called 
Surjopranoto, endeared as the ‘raja mogok’ or strike king, challenged Semaun – the 
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leader of the PKI at that time. The Dutch did not sit silent during this power struggle: 
they implemented measures to oppress trade unions when they saw that the trade unions 
were gaining power and consisted mostly of Indonesians. 
During this phase, with the Dutch becoming more and more repressive toward 
Indonesians, the Indonesians found that it would no longer be possible to cooperate with 
the Dutch (Brown, 2003). It was only after this period of political conflicts among 
Indonesian elites and the unbearable oppression of the Dutch that the Indonesians 
started to feel the need to unite and fight against colonialism.  
Soekarno then walked into the scene. He was a member of the Sarekat Islam and was 
therefore close to many political leaders. He was among the few of the Indonesian elites 
who were able to receive education in the European system. During his studies in 
Bandung, Soekarno became acquainted to the Indische Partij led by Douwes Dekker, 
Tjipto Mangunkusumo and Ki Hadjar Dewantara which was basically the only party 
which had the concept of Indonesia as an entire nation, as opposed to one divided by 
ethnicity or religion. 
In 1927, Soekarno founded the Perserikatan Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian 
Nationalist Association) which then evolved into the Partai Nasional Indonesia (the 
‘Indonesian Nationalist Party’ or the PNI). The party consisted on Indonesians and had 
the aim of independence for the Indonesian archipelago as a whole. The growth of the 
PNI also led to the growth of the idea of Indonesia as one state. Other parties such as the 
SI and the IP were either drawn to the PNI or lost their power and faded into inactivity. 
At approximately the same period, Indonesian students in the Netherlands also started 
nationalist movements. Muhammad Hatta (later appointed as vice-president of 
Soekarno) was arrested in 1927 by the Dutch, on the charge that they were encouraging 
armed resistance against the Dutch in Indonesia. Hatta was tried in The Hague 1928, 
where he was acquitted. Upon his release, Hatta made a speech relating to the Dutch 
oppression and the importance of the nationalist ideals against colonialism (Ricklefs, 
2001). 
Finally realizing the threat of the nationalist movements in Indonesia, the Dutch 
government arrested Soekarno and sent him to public trials in Bandung in 1930. During 
the trials, Soekarno made defence speeches echoing the ideals which were made by 
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Hatta during his trials in the Hague. Soekarno was charged for disturbance to public 
order and was then sentenced to four years in prison. 
Nationalist ideals spread through Indonesia like wildfire, despite the arrest of Soekarno 
and other nationalist leaders. The concept was reiterated with the proclamation of 
Sumpah Pemuda (‘Youth Pledge’) at a Youth Congress in Batavia in 1928. The Pledge 
contained three basic ideals: one motherland, the land of Indonesia; one nation, the 
nation of Indonesia; and one language, the language of Indonesia (satu nusa, Indonesia; 
satu bangsa, bangsa Indonesia; dan satu bahasa, Bahasa Indonesia). 
Aside from these socio-political factors, Indonesia was also deeply affected by the 1929 
global economic crisis. At that point, Indonesia was largely export-dependent, and the 
markets which usually Indonesia sent its goods to were starting to falter and adopt 
protectionist policies. In the face of these events, the Dutch abandoned their laissez-
faire economic policies and scrambled to stay on their feet as welfare in Indonesia, not 
only for the Indonesians, was in clear decline (Ricklefs, 2001). 
At this point, the nationalist movement slightly withered; it only rose again under the 
direction of Sutomo and Thamrin, both of which championed the idea of eventual 
independence, but with Dutch cooperation (Ricklefs, 2001). Hatta and Sutan Sjahrir 
also created a new nationalist party and established the Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia 
or Indonesian National Education. They named this the New PNI and were determined 
not to meet the same fate as the old PNI under Soekarno. One of the issues they 
addressed was that this party should consist of people who truly understood the issues 
faced by Indonesia, and the ideologies championed by the New PNI. The old PNI was a 
mass-based party which collapsed with the loss of its leader (Brown, 2003). Upon his 
release, Soekarno also joined and tried to merge the New PNI with Partindo, but to no 
avail. He then joined Partindo fully and became Chairman of the party. 
By 1932 - 1933, nationalist movements were too strong for the Dutch to ignore. The 
Dutch government acted aggressively: schools were searched, political literature were 
seized, teachers were banned from teaching in schools, etc. A new, more conservative 
Governor-General was elected to reign over Batavia. Bonifacius C. De Jonge brought 
on a new hail of tighter rules against nationalist movements. However, this was not his 
only strategy to quash nationalist movements.  
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Indonesia, like many other countries at that time, was also significantly affected by the 
1929 crisis. With exports rates falling, prices of goods rising, many cuts on wages, and 
shortage of resources, many Indonesians revolted. De Jonge cleverly used this revolt 
and linked them to PNI or Partindo movements, and used them as an excuse to apply 
more pressure and scrutiny for the political leaders of these parties. In 1933, civil 
servants were banned from joining either party (Brown, 2003). Soekarno, Hatta and 
Sjahrir were all arrested and exiled to other parts of the archipelago. 
With the collapse of nationalist parties, the Volksraad was the only outlet in which 
Indonesians were able to fight for some sort of independence. Soetardjo 
Kartohadiekoesoemo, a member of the Volksraad, made a petition to the Dutch 
government in 1936 to arrange an Indonesian autonomy under Dutch-Indonesian 
cooperation. The Volksraad adopted the petition, though, unsurprisingly, the 
government in The Hague rejected this proposition in 1938. 
The late 1930s and early 1940s saw an increase in Japanese and German strengths, 
especially when Germany ignited the Second World War. 1940 saw the entering into of 
the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy. As France was defeated, Japan 
then gained control of the French territories in Indochina. As Germany invaded the 
Netherlands, the Dutch leaders flew to London, leaving the Dutch colonies in a 
vulnerable position. The Japanese leaders then took this advantage and started to openly 
discuss the issue of Indonesian independence.
10
 
Japan increased its strengths; its infamous attacks on Pearl Harbour, Hong Kong, etc. 
significantly boosted its confidence. Japanese forces then engaged the allied forces in 
the Java Sea. At that time, the Indonesians were reluctant to show support for either 
party, but in this sense, their lack of help toward the Dutch became one of the factors of 
the allied forces’ defeat. By March of 1942, the Dutch had surrendered to the Japanese 
and the Dutch colonial state in Indonesia collapsed.
11
 
ii. Japanese Occupation 
The Japanese then occupied Indonesia for three and a half years, up to its defeat in the 
Second World War. During this time, the Japanese used Indonesia to the full extent for 
mobilisation of forces in its effort to maintain superior footing in the War. Japanese 
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policy towards Indonesians had two priorities: to wipe out Western influences among 
them and to mobilise them in the interests of Japanese victory.
12
 The Martial Law was 
applied in Indonesia, though Dutch laws were also applied (except in cases where it 
contradicted the Japanese military laws and the Martial Laws).
13
 The Indonesians 
themselves were left confused, mainly due to the fact that there were no existing 
organised resistance against Japanese forces anywhere.
14
 
In 1943, Indonesians, especially Indonesian workers, were forced to face one of the 
worst working conditions ever known. In October 1943, the Japanese implemented the 
romusha (volunteer workers) where they forcefully recruited workers, mainly from 
Java, to work wherever the Japanese deemed necessary. 
15
 Much of these works 
included the destruction of plantations, existing infrastructure and also the destruction 
of social and political instruments introduced during the Dutch colonisation (Brown, 
2003). 
In terms of welfare, the Japanese did not seek to treat the Indonesians as a people with 
their own power. Most of the Japanese policies of that period focused on the use of the 
Indonesian people as a commodity. The romusha and military mobilisation of the 
Indonesian people is evidence of this. During this period, the Japanese also mobilised 
armed forces such as the PETA (Pembela Tanah Air/Protectors of the Fatherland) and 
Putera (Son/Prince, derived from Pusat Tenaga Rakyat/Centre for People’s Power), 
putting strong Indonesian leaders such as Hatta, Soekarno and Sudirman on the helm.
16
 
The mobilisation of armies had an adverse effect on Japanese control over Indonesians. 
Revolutions against the Japanese started in many regions in Indonesia. By September 
1944, the Japanese Prime Minister Koiso promised independence for the To-Indo (East 
Indies), although he did not mention exactly when this independence would be granted. 
By 1945, the Japanese had effectively lost control of both Indonesian forces and also 
their fight in the War. In March 1945, the Japanese formed the Badan Penyelidik Usaha 
Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia or the ‘BPUPKI’ (the Investigating Committee for 
Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence). By July 1945, all Japanese elements 
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agreed that Indonesia was to be granted Independence.
17
 During this time, the BPUPKI, 
which consisted of well-established nationalist leaders, drafted the Indonesian 
constitution. The Japanese, who were hard-pressed by the Allied forces, promised 
Indonesian independence in September or shortly thereafter. However, the bombings in 
Nagasaki and Hiroshima changed this condition. By 15 August 1945, the Japanese had 
surrendered to the Allied forces. This period led to a political hiatus for Indonesia, as 
the Allied forces had yet to make a move to take over control over Indonesian 
territories. The youth movements in Indonesia urged Soekarno and Hatta to declare 
independence outside of the Japanese arrangements, to which both Soekarno and Hatta 
were reluctant to do. However, with many arrangements made by Maeda (a Japanese 
leader which was sympathetic to Indonesian independence movements), Soekarno 
declared Indonesian independence on 17 August 1945. 
18
 
The declaration, though very diplomatic in words, nevertheless was effective in marking 
an independent state of Indonesia: 
We the people of Indonesia hereby declare 
the independence of Indonesia. 
Matters concerning the transfer of power, etc., will be carried out 
in a conscientious manner and as speedily as possible. 
 
Jakarta, 17 August 1945. 
 
In the name of the people of Indonesia, 
[signed] Soekarno Hatta 
iii. Emergence of Indonesia as a Nation State 
We can see from the above sections that Indonesia did not start as a nation state, but as 
separate small kingdoms or communities without the ideology for unity. It was only 
after the colonisation of the Dutch that the Indonesians started to gather their forces 
under nationalist united ideologies. This lack of a concept for a nation state, of course, 
detracted the existence of a welfare state as no state existed at that time. The people 
themselves were fairly dispersed and organised by local ethnicities and locales instead 
of by a formal state. 
After the arrival of the Dutch, the concept of Indonesia as an organised area of East 
Indies, hence giving rise to a more holistic view of Indonesia as a united entity, instead 
of the separate local leaderships. The revolution to break from colonial authorities, of 
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course, aided in giving Indonesians a sense of unity in that they all had a common 
enemy. Nonetheless, the deep rooted separation through diverse ethnicities and 
geographic positions also adds to the difficulty in creating a united Indonesian Republic. 
Nonetheless, Indonesia elites in Java finally declared her independence and this is what 
then set off a more tangible struggle for a united republic.  
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Table 5 – Summary of Development of Indonesian State up to 1940s  
No. Year Condition of State Authority Welfare Policies 
1.  1600s 
to  
early 
1900s 
Ideological Development 
- No concept of ‘Indonesia’ as single united 
nation state, still considered as ‘East Indies’ 
- Divided into hundreds of different kingdoms 
and townships 
- Attempts at trade relations transformed into 
fully-fledged colonisation by the Dutch 
- Power struggles between Dutch and other 
European colonisers over East Indies area 
 
Economic Condition  
- Based on agriculture sector where production 
was in rural areas 
- Trade in imports and exports already existed 
amongst kingdoms with ‘foreign’ entities, 
especially for Arabs and Europeans  
 
- Dutch colonial authority 
- Local kingdoms and town 
leaders 
- Existent in forms of communal 
‘sympathy’ social benefits 
- No national legal policies 
2.  Early 
1900s  
Ideological Development 
- Emergence of idea of Indonesia as a united 
entity but not as independent state 
- Establishment of Volksraad allowing 
Indonesian participation in politics 
- Dutch divided Indonesia into large regions and 
appointed bupatis to rule each region 
- Concept of local kingdoms still exist, but not as 
strong 
- 1906 Village Regulation was introduced 
- Very clear ethnic separation by Dutch colonial 
- Dutch colonial authority 
- Volksraad 
- Regional Bupatis chosen 
by the Volksraad or Dutch 
colonial authority 
- Local kingdoms and town 
leaders 
- Dutch decupled public health 
expenditures (mostly focused in 
Java) 
- Approximately 1030 qualified 
doctors in all Indonesia, 667 of 
which in Java 
- Healthcare at villages practically 
non-existent 
- Establishment of various important 
schools and universities which give 
access to indigenous Indonesians 
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government  
- Rise of religious leaders with nationalist ideals  
- Establishment of Budi Utomo which became 
one of the strongholds for nationalist 
movements 
- Establishment of various trade unions 
- Islamic ideologies dominated 
 
Economic Condition  
- Agriculture still dominated, many people still in 
rural areas 
- Exports consisted of spices with sugar and 
coffee on the rise 
 
3.  1920s Ideological Development  
- Emergence of concept of Indonesia as an 
independent nation state 
- Rise of nationalist and leftist parties demanding 
for Indonesian state devoid of religious 
connotations 
- Continued rise of religious leaders in early 
1920s, with fall by mid 1920s 
- Dutch became more oppressive to quash 
nationalist movements 
- Establishment (and some years later, the fall) of 
the Indonesian Communist Party 
- Rise of trade union power 
- Arrest of important political leaders (including 
Soekarno, Hatta, etc.) 
 
- Dutch colonial authority 
- Volksraad 
- Regional Bupatis chosen 
by the Volksraad or Dutch 
colonial authority 
- Local kingdoms and town 
leaders 
- Religious leaders 
 
- Strength of unions allowed rise of 
wages, though no legal ‘minimum 
wage’ was implemented 
- Still strong reliance for communal 
forms of welfare security 
- Crisis impacted poverty levels 
causing Dutch to decrease welfare 
expenditures 
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Economic Condition 
- Indonesia hit by global economic crisis which 
triggered repatriation of Javanese migrants due 
to fall of coffee and sugar exports 
- Influx of Japanese products causing Dutch 
dominance for money to decrease 
 
4.  1930s 
to 
early 
1940s 
Ideological Development 
- Dutch colonial government moved toward 
more right-wing leanings 
- Volksraad was effectively rendered useless by 
de Jonge 
- Weakening of nationalist movements due to 
Dutch oppression and arrest of political leaders 
- Rise of idea to ‘cooperate’ with Dutch colonial 
authority instead of fighting for complete 
independence 
- Arrival of Japanese to take over Dutch colony 
- Fall of Japanese occupation due to losses in 
World War II to Allied Forces  
 
Economic Condition 
- Indies government began to adopt protectionist 
policies as response to crisis 
- Imports from Japan are limited 
- Economic crisis still affects expenditures for 
public facilities 
- Shortage of supplies due to World War II 
- Dutch colonial authority 
- Japanese militia authority 
- Volksraad in diluted sense 
- Regional Bupatis chosen 
by the Volksraad or Dutch 
colonial authority 
- Weak local kingdoms and 
town leaders 
- Religious leaders 
 
- Still strong reliance on communal 
village social benefits 
- Impacts of crisis led to decrease in 
welfare expenditures 
Source – Author, compilation of various works (2015
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2. Post-Independence Indonesia 
i. Soekarno Democratic Experiment 
After its declaration of independence in 1945, Indonesians were faced with new 
problems. The Dutch made two great efforts to re-establish themselves in Indonesia 
following Japanese defeat. Indonesians scrambled to fend-off Dutch forces, though not 
all of them agreed to full Indonesian independence from Dutch. The Japanese also still 
held practical control over much of west and central Indonesia, despite having 
surrendered to the Allied forces, who told the Japanese to maintain status quo over the 
East Indies. Although it seemed as if a revolution had occurred, resulting in the 
proclamation of Indonesian independence, the sense of unity amongst the Indonesians 
themselves was still quite complicated. Considering also the fact that Indonesia spans a 
very wide space, news of the proclamation for independence also did not spread as fast 
as people hoped, some even disbelieved this news. During this period, Soekarno, who 
was then appointed as president of the republic, was kept busy by balancing the revolts 
of pro-independence youth movements with a non-offensive approach toward the 
Japanese. It was not until September when the Japanese officially declared defeat that 
the news of independence really spread throughout Indonesia, igniting youth 
movements. 
These youth movements made some grand conquests: Jakarta youths took over tram, 
railway and radio stations without much resistance from the Japanese; the same also 
applied for Jogjakarta, Surakarta, Bandung and Malang. Mass rallies occurred in 
Jakarta, of which approximately 200,000 youths gathered around Medan Merdeka 
(Freedom Square), to which Soekarno used his oratory skills to disperse the crowd, 
preventing any confrontations with well-armed Japanese troops.
19
 1946 also saw the 
initial involvement of the United Nations in the Indonesia matter.
20
 In 1947, the UN 
pleaded for an Indonesian ceasefire between the Dutch and the Indonesians, to which 
the Dutch and Soekarno obeyed by August 1947.
21
 
The period between 1945 and late 1950s saw many struggles for power amongst 
Indonesians with different camps of thought, mostly led by Soekarno at one end and 
Hatta and Sjahrir at the other. Communist and socialist parties were also re-established 
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during this period, with former communist and socialist leaders at the helm, returning 
after their exiles.
22
 The PKI increased in size, and by 1948 was considered a formidable 
force. Musso, a PKI leader who returned from his exile from the Soviet Union, arranged 
a coup d’etat. Hatta responded by denouncing the coup and quashing the communist 
movements. Within a month, Musso was killed and the communists lost its footing. 
Ever since this 1948 Madiun incident, Indonesians have held communism as something 
of distrust, as they deemed it as a betrayal by communists in their fight for 
independence.
23
 Despite that, the PKI still played a role by establishing the All-
Indonesia Workers’ Organisation Centre (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia 
or SOBSI) which was an organisation controlled by PKI, but was then able to spread 
through to many layers of the Indonesian community, including the peasants.
24
 
Even though Indonesia was independent (at least in the de jure sense), it took quite 
some time for the elites to arrange a democratic election which could represent the 
people of Indonesia. A volatile and young country still in the pulsing throes of being 
new born, spread over a vast area separated by large expanses of sea, it was difficult for 
anyone to arrange even a shadow of democracy. The situation was not made easier 
when the elites in Jakarta itself held in contempt (or, at best, underestimated) those 
average laypersons, many of whom were not well educated, disregarding the fact that 
this still constituted the majority of the Indonesian population (Ricklefs, 2001). After 
having managed to postpone it for five years, finally in 1955, an election was made in 
Indonesia, with quite an undeterminable result as the votes were spread over more or 
less 28 parties, with the PNI gaining the largest with only 22% of the votes.
25
  
Economically, at this period in the 1950s to 1960s, Indonesia was also not doing very 
well. Inflation rates were through the roof, burdening the people. Soekarno did not have 
a focus on the economy of the people. Industrialisation and urbanisation was hardly the 
common mode at this time.  
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Figure 3 – Annual Inflation Rate During Soekarno Regime to beginning of 
Soeharto Regime 
Source: World Development Indicators 
Soekarno introduced the so-called ‘Guided Economy’ (Ekonomi Terpimpin) at the 
period of 1959, which eliminated all foreign control in the private sector (Touwen, 
2008; Linblad, 2010; in Suryahadi et al, 2014). However, Indonesia was still expected 
to have been a fast-growing economy for its age, and yet it merely had an average of 1% 
of GDP per capita growth per annum during the period of 1950 to 1965, especially as it 
is set against an average of 2% economic growth per annum (Booth, 1998; in Suryahadi 
et al, 2014). 
Many plantations and industrial installations were destroyed during the Japanese 
occupation, hence many relied on their own land for subsistence (see previous section 
on Japanese occupation). However, this did not last long. Due to a population boom 
which occurred in the 1950s and 1960s (with Indonesia having approximately 97 
million people in the 1960s census (Ricklefs, 2001)), it was obvious that the agriculture 
industry could not provide sufficient yield for the survival of families. Much of the land 
was insufficient to either absorb the labour supply available or to produce sufficient 
yield. Hence, many turned to find paid labour in the bigger cities. Urbanisation then 
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started to commence, with more than a 10% increase in the number of urban population 
between the 1930s and 1960s (Ricklefs, 2001). 
After the revolution, many of the former soldiers were unemployed and were now 
seeking for jobs. At this point, Indonesia did not yet have a developed industry and the 
agriculture sector could not absorb any more labour. The government then created 
policies which bloated the number of civil servants and government jobs. There were 
approximately a total of 807,000 people employed by the government by 1960. Salaries 
were low and security was intangible, but these people had no other choice, hence they 
persisted (Ricklefs, 2001). 
Considering these, state-provided social security was virtually non-existent in this era. 
Many of the population were still living in rural areas and industrialisation was still at a 
minimum. As is the case in many Asian countries, any forms of social security were 
likely to be those which relied on the extended family and community assistance. These 
come into force in times of crises where the family or community groups provide 
assistance for occurrences such as loss of income, illnesses, disability or old age 
(Esmara and Tjiptoherijanto, 1986; in Suryahadi et al 2014). 
Figure 4 –Urban Population (% Total Population) during Soekarno Regime 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 
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The first type of protection that the government offered in this era was a compensation 
for work accidents which covered medical care, invalidity and death benefits which was 
promulgated through Law Number 33 of 1947 regarding work accidents, and later 
expanded through Law Number 2 of 1951. This Law included provisions to provide 
transportation costs from the accident site to the hospital; all hospital costs including 
admittance, doctor and medicine fees; burial expenses in case of death; and 
compensation in case of death or permanent injury causing disability (see Table 6 for 
details).  
But it was only toward the beginning of the 1960s that the government implemented 
insurance programs, albeit only for civil servants. In 1963, the government introduced 
the Civil Servant Welfare Fund (Dana Kesedjahteraan Pegawai Negeri or “Dasperi”) 
and the Civil Servant Insurance Savings (Tabungan Asuransi Pegawai Negeri or 
“Taspen”). Dasperi covered the families of civil servants in events such as natural 
disasters; Taspen was aimed more for retired civil servants and their dependents (this 
included retirement benefits for pension-age civil servants and military personnel, with 
additional amounts for their dependents). Taspen was managed through PN Taspen 
which was a state-owned company. (Suryahadi et al, 2014). This type of insurance was 
then extended to people employed in the formal private sector in 1964 through the 
establishment of the Social Security Fund where the contribution was cut from the 
worker’s wage. Nonetheless, this program was operated on a voluntary basis and 
covered mainly health-related benefits such as health-care in case of illness or in case of 
accidents (see Table 6) (Suryahadi et al, 2014).  
Aside from the socio-economic factors, many believe that it was due to ideological 
differences that the Soekarno regime was then ‘easily’ discarded. Soekarno is known for 
his beliefs in Marhaenism, a term which is rumoured to have been claimed by Soekarno 
who coined it after conversing with a farmer called Marhaen. Many have also debated 
that perhaps this was his interpretation of Marx’ and Engels’ works, hence the term 
Mar-Haen. Either way, Soekarno championed a supposed ‘guided democracy’26, though 
it is unclear as to what ‘guided’ means in this sense. 27 In any case, this can be seen as 
his departure from western and foreign influences, and an attempt to establish a 
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38 
 
 
 
democracy based on the pre-existing systems of the indigenous Indonesian democracy 
which emphasises the need for a lengthy discussion (musyawarah), eventually leading 
to a consensus (mufakat). This is especially apparent in Article 33 of the Indonesian 
1945 Constitution and point 4 of the Indonesian Pancasila (Indonesian ‘ideology’). 
Despite this, rebellions rose in many parts of Indonesia, one of the strongest being in 
Sumatra. Lieutenant General Nasution advised Soekarno to take action against this 
rebellion, to which he succeeded in quashing. This gave more power to Soekarno, who 
was then able to ban the two most prominent political parties, the Masyumi and the 
Socialist Party, which he associated with rebel movements. At a position of favour with 
Soekarno, Nasution then proposed a double-function of the army, whereby he proposed 
that the army shall stand in middle ground. He was famously quoted to have said the 
following: 
We do not and we will not copy the situation as it exists in several Latin 
American states where the army acts as a direct political force; nor will we 
emulate the Western European model where armies are the dead tools [of the 
government] or the example of Eastern Europe.
28 
 
Of course by mid 1960s, many South American countries such as Brazil, were already 
under military dictatorship where the military played an active role in the oppression of 
its people, and held political supreme power.
29
 Around the same period, the Malaysians 
also were in negotiations with the British to create a new Federation of Malaysia, which 
included parts of the British outposts in South-east Asia. Soekarno took a strong stance 
against this, claiming that this was another form of colonisation, to which he was 
strongly opposed. In September of 1963, Soekarno embarked on the campaign 
“Ganyang Malaysia” (Crush Malaysia) where he deployed troops to the borders at 
Kalimantan. He had strong support from many parties, PKI among the strongest. The 
army, however, was more ambivalent. Nonetheless, the ‘war’ against Malaysia came to 
a spectacular end. Soekarno withdrew Indonesian membership from the UN in protest 
of Malaysia being elected to one of the seats at the Security Council. However, in 1965, 
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Soeharto came to take control of the army. Soeharto took a more diplomatic approach 
toward the Malaysia issue. This proved to be a significant act, as Soeharto then led the 
coup d’etat which tumbled Soekarno. 
Soeharto, being the leader of the army, was at odds with the PKI - with Soekarno stuck 
in between but leaning more towards the PKI. On 30 September 1965, alleged members 
of PKI youth and women kidnapped and assassinated six of Indonesia’s most senior and 
prominent members of the Army. This ignited what became known as the Gerakan 30 
September PKI (the 30 September Movement) where various troops mobilized in 
Jakarta. Soeharto moved swiftly to quash these movements, and by 1 October, Jakarta 
was firmly in his hands. These events also led to many anti-communist policies adopted 
in Indonesia up to this day. 
Soeharto then campaigned for a ‘New Order’ government for Indonesia. Soeharto was 
able to do the following during this time of transition: 
 
He secured a mandate to exercise temporary authority in Sukarno’s name 
on 11 March 1966. He became Acting President in 1967 and finally 
displaced Sukarno as President in 1968. By the end of the 1960s, the 
ousting of Sukarno was virtually complete. Held under house arrest, and 
in bad health, he [Soekarno] eventually died in Jakarta on 21 June 1970.
30
 
 
This letter mandating Soeharto to take over was called the Supersemar (an acronym for 
the Letter of 11 March, which to this day has disappeared), granted Soeharto with full 
powers to ‘stabilise’ the political turmoil in Indonesia. But it wasn’t until 1967 that 
Soeharto finally made his last move to remove Soekarno. Soeharto appointed new 
members of parliament (DPR-GR) to replace purged members, and then convened the 
Temporary Parliament (MPRS) in March 1967. Amidst rumours that the navy’s marine-
corps (KKO: Korps Komando), the police and the Brawijaya Division would defend 
Soekarno, and with 80 000 troops occupying Jakarta, on 12 March the MPRS stripped 
Sukarno of all powers and titles and named Soeharto Acting President (Ricklefs, 2001).  
This led to 32 years of pseudo-dictatorship in Indonesia under Soeharto. 
The power struggles in the era of Soekarno was mostly focused on creating and 
disseminating the concept of Indonesia as a united nation state under the banner of the 
Republic of Indonesia. This forced economic policies to take a back seat in his mind, 
                                                 
30
 See Brown. p. 199 
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even though his economic advisors warned him that there was much to be fixed after the 
release of the Dutch and the Japanese. Soekarno opted instead to focus on political and 
ideological assimilation in order to create a more ‘stable’ Indonesia. This is 
understandable, considering that the people who resided in the area of Indonesia itself 
still have not fully embraced the concept of unity. Nonetheless, the consequence of this 
was that there was hardly any economic progress, and in turn there was large economic 
decline and crisis, as mentioned in the previous sections.  
Welfare, then, was also not a major concern for Soekarno, even when his cabinet and 
economic ministers encouraged him to lay some foundations of welfare systems to 
manage with the poverty in Indonesia, especially on the island of Java. Steps to create 
foundations for welfare could not have come to higher fruition considering the fact that 
Indonesia hardly had any resources to distribute to its people. 
Hence, we can conclude that in the Soekarno era, due to political instability and 
economic decline, it was not possible to create foundations for a welfare state.  
 
41 
 
 
 
Table 6 – Summary of conditions in Soekarno Democratic Experiment Era 
No. Year Economic and Social 
Developments 
Social Security Regimes Related Legislation 
1.  1945 to 
1950s 
- Independence of Indonesia 
announced by Soekarno and 
Hatta, who later became President 
and Vice-President of the 
Republic 
- Although pronounced 
independent, it took time for the 
news to spread all over Indonesia 
- Youth movements confronted 
Japanese forces 
- UN involvement in ordering 
ceasefire between Indonesians 
and Japanese troops 
- Resurrection of communist and 
socialist parties 
- First ever election was held in 
Indonesia in 1955 
- 28 parties participated, PNI ‘won’ 
by gaining only 22% of total valid 
votes 
- Inflation reached up to 1000% 
- Population boom causing higher 
demand for food, hence 
increasing food imports 
- Work Accidents Law passed in 1947, then in 
1951, which covers health care in case of 
accidents occurring at work, including 
compensation in case of death and/or 
permanent injury causing disability and 
inability to work 
- In case of death, the family of the deceased 
will receive compensation in the form of a 
percentage of the deceased’s salary 
- Payment of compensation in case of death is 
paid to the children until they reach 16 years 
old while the widow shall be paid until he/she 
is able to find a job or has remarried 
- Law applicable for persons and/or companies 
within Indonesia who employ at least one 
person 
- Encouragement of entrance into government-
backed schools, causing higher literacy rates 
- Law 33 of 1947 regarding 
Work Accidents, later 
amended into Law 
Number 2 of 1951 
regarding the same 
 
2.  1960s - Soekarno as the main state leader, 
while there were experiments 
- Establishment of the Dasperi and the Taspen 
- Dasperi covers compensation for civil 
- Government Regulation 
Number 11 of 1963 
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with democracy and parliament 
systems 
- Soekarno opted to juggle between 
Soviet and Chinese communist 
and American liberal ideologies, 
introducing a ‘guided democracy’  
- Soekarno’s attempt at ‘guided 
democracy’ failed, followed by 
rise of Soeharto in a coup 
- Soeharto rose to power, backed 
by military 
- Annihilation of communist and 
socialist ideologies through 
massacre of suspected PKI 
members  
servants and their families, in case of natural 
disasters or other ‘emergencies’, to be taken 
from a monthly contribution of 3% of their 
salary 
- Taspen covers retirement benefits for civil 
servants and military personnel (including 
their respective dependents), to be taken from 
a monthly contribution of 7% of their salary 
- Establishment of Yayasan Dana Jaminan 
Sosial (Social Security Fund Foundation or 
YDJS) 
- YDJS covers mainly health benefits for 
workers who are formally employed in the 
private sector 
regarding Dasperi 
-  Government Regulation 
Number 10 of 1963 
regarding Taspen 
- Minister of Labour 
Regulation Number 5 of 
1964 regarding Social 
Security Fund 
Source – Author, compilation of various works (2015) 
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ii. Soeharto ‘New Order’ Regime 
With Soeharto’s New Order regime, the army was left in great power to crush its two 
main opposition: the communists and islamists. The communists received the worse end 
of the package where Soeharto and many youth groups supporting the Soeharto New 
Order (one of the most infamous being the ‘youth group’ Pemuda Pancasila, which 
took active part in the killings of supposed communists in 1965 to 1966)
31
 purged the 
communists and demanded the destruction of the PKI. The PKI was then formally 
banned in March 1966. From this point on, many anti-communist policies were adapted, 
such as that candidates of public servants and the army must prove that neither they nor 
their family were ever involved or been accused of being involved in communist 
movements. This practice persists to this day, even with the fall of Soeharto in 1998. 
During this period, Soeharto also crushed labour movements by associating them to 
communist and socialist movements. He abolished the SOBSI and created a trade union 
under the name of Federasi Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (the All-Indonesian 
Workers Federation) under full control of the central government. He did not allow any 
other trade unions to be established during his 32-year regime.
32
 Many oppressions 
typical of dictatorships occurred during Soeharto’s regime; kidnappings and sudden 
disappearances of activists or even politically-inclined authors and even poets often 
occurred. Corruption and nepotism also riddled the government of Soeharto. The 
occupation of Timor Leste and the annexation of West Papua also occurred during this 
period, by sheer military force and uncanny political domination. Military power was a 
strong force during almost all 32-years of the Soeharto regime, where not only did they 
hold defences of the country, they also held strong political participation through direct 
representation in the parliament as well as executive government. Despite this strong 
handed style of governance, Soeharto achieved much economic growth, which can be 
seen in the strong macroeconomic performance, natural resource revenues channelled 
relatively effectively towards ‘developmental’ (here taken to mean growth-enhancing) 
outcomes (Lewis, 2007; McCawley, 2005 – in Harris and Foresti, 2011). 
                                                 
31
 See film “The Act of Killing” by Joshua Oppenheimer. 2012. This award-winning film speaks about the 
purging of the PKI in 1965, told from the viewpoint of the executioners. Regardless of the critiques of 
this film, it sheds some light into the gravity of ideological cleansing in Indonesia, which is somewhat 
still present even in modern Indonesian society today. 
32
 See: http://andreasbieler.blogspot.com.br/2013/03/the-trouble-with-indonesian-labour.html accessed on 
9 January 2015. 
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Figure 5 – GDP Per Capita during Soeharto Regime 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 
GDP growth in the beginning of the New Order regime (between 1967 to 1973) was 
stable, despite being a fairly new born country. Industrialisation began to emerge and 
economic growth started to increase, as may be seen by the sharp hikes in GDP during 
the end of the 1970s and 1980s (see Figure 5, only a proxy od the GDP includes 
population growth). By the end of the 1980s and the beginning of 1990s, Indonesia was 
caught up in the snowstorm of economic growth, as with many other countries in the 
Asian region at that time. The economy crashed during the Asian Financial Crisis in 
1997-1998, which also brought with it high political unrest.  
In the end of the 1960s, during a type of transition period between the Soekarno regime 
and the New Order, Soeharto played a politically and economically strong role in 
obtaining financial support from foreign allies. By this time, Indonesia had accumulated 
a debt of approximately US$ 2.36 billion, of which the majority (approximately 59.5%) 
was owed to Communist states, the rest to Western states (Japan being the largest 
contributor outside of the Communist circle) (Ricklefs, 2001). Annual inflation was 
calculated to be in excess of 600 percent, the money supply was over 800 times the 
figure shown in 1955 and the government deficit was over 780 times that of 1961 (and 
1.8 times the total money supply) (Ricklefs, 2001). The end of this decade saw the 
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economic efforts of Adam Malik and Soeharto’s inner circle to restructure these debts in 
order to buy time.  
Figure 6 – Inflation Rates during Soeharto Regime 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 
 
It is with these restructuring programs that Soeharto negotiated for economic assistance 
from the Western world, by being more compliant toward the demands of the World 
Bank and the IMF. In consultation with the IMF, Soeharto’s advisors (mostly Berkley-
educated technocrats, endearingly known as the ‘Berkley mafia’) introduced budgetary 
restraints, high interest rates, stricter export controls and anti-corruption measures 
beginning in October. Confiscated British and American firms were soon restored to 
their owners and in February 1967 a new investment law was promulgated to encourage 
foreign investment. The 1970s saw the rise of laissez-faire open door policies which 
encouraged foreign investments and strict internal economic controls with the aim of 
maximum economic growth (Ricklefs, 2001).  
We can observe that the difference between the economic policies of the Soekarno and 
the Soeharto regimes are that Soeharto takes a more open approach, whereas Soekarno 
was rather more nationalistic and closed. One can argue that this open economy sparked 
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the rapid growth in Indonesia during the Soeharto period. For example, we can see that 
the GDP per capita had an average of 4.6% between the period of 1967 to 1991, where 
the GDP per capita in 1967 was merely US$56 which then grew to approximately 
US$705 in 1991 (Suryahadi et al, 2014), .  
Of course, we must also consider the economic benefits of the oil booms in 1973-1974 
and 1978-1979 which increased the Indonesian government’s export earnings and 
revenues (Suryahadi et al, 2014). When the oil boom ended in 1980, Soeharto’s New 
Order redirected the economy to depend less on oil and move toward export-oriented 
manufacturing. This also enables the expansion of large public investments in 
education, health, family planning and infrastructure (Suryahadi et al, 2014). 
Nonetheless, this movement into a more open economy allowed a higher rate of foreign 
exchange which enabled Indonesia to import capital goods and raw materials for the 
manufacturing sector that is so vital and important after the end of the oil boom in the 1980s 
(Suryahadi et al, 2014). 
Figure 7 – Urban Population (% Total Population) during Soeharto Regime 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 
 
At this time, the people of Indonesia were beginning to move toward urbanisation, with 
nearly 40% of the total population in 1998 living in urban areas. Many people from the 
rural areas have migrated, mainly due to economic necessities where they are 
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urged/forced to move to urban areas in search of better living. Many of the 
industrialisation also occurred in the larger cities of Indonesia, mainly in the island of 
Java. As early as 1971, for example, Jakarta was already inhabited by approximately 4.5 
million people, with the island of Java itself ‘housing’ around 60% of the total 
population in 1971 (Ricklefs, 2001). Despite government policies urging 
‘transmigration’, which is the movement of peoples from the more populated islands 
such as Java to the less populated islands such as Kalimantan, there was still a strong 
perception that Java is where the ‘gold mine’ is. Even when the ‘transmigration’ 
programs provided financial incentives for the people who participated, many still held 
beliefs that Java and Jakarta were the best places to seek job opportunities. 
Figure 8 – Poor Population (% Total Population) in New Order Regime33 
 
Source – Badan Pusat Statistik Indonesia (2015) 
National poverty then also became a problem in the beginning of the Soeharto era, 
mainly concentrated in the urban areas. With quite a high rate of urbanisation, and yet 
not enough employment opportunities, many of the population were forced into 
informal and precarious labour. Many of them were also still suffering from the after 
effects of the Japanese occupation. Some, of course, were still in the rural areas and 
were engaged in agricultural sectors. With the rise of the oil boom and the 
                                                 
33
 The Indonesian Statistics Agency states that the poverty line is calculated based on the fulfillment of 
2100 kcal/day/person, of which it is divided into 52 main commodities such as rice, vegetables, milk, etc. 
This is then converted into prices, which is then used to measure the poverty line.  
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manufacturing sector, we can see that these industries absorbed much of the labour 
force and in turn greatly alleviated the poverty in Indonesia. 
It was due to this urbanisation movement and poverty that it was necessary to 
implement some kind of social security system, because once the person has left the 
rural area, they are no longer able to rely on the familial and communal support initially 
available to them in the rural areas. Most of them then relied on the opportunities 
presented by being employed in state-owned or army-owned enterprises, where they had 
at least a minimum level of protection and welfare which included pension plans and 
health care measures (see Table 7 for summary of these social security benefits, and 
subsequent sections for description of social security policies implemented during this 
era). However, most of this was not as easy to find as it sounds. The country was swiftly 
growing and rising economically, and yet the welfare of its people were still 
questionable, despite the high rates of industrialisation and urbanisation. 
Figure 9 – Gini Coefficient during Soeharto’s Regime 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 
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During the New Order regime, political power was mostly held by military elites, 
civilian bureaucrats supporting the military elites, as well as a small circle of cukongs 
(Chinese-descent businessmen). The military elites held political power as they played a 
dual-function, and actively participated in the daily political affairs of the country. The 
basis for this is basically that welfare could not be separated from the defence and 
security of the state.  
These elites also played a strong economic role, as the army branched out to create their 
own capitalist investments. Permina (the army’s lucrative oil business) held many 
agreements and joint ventures with Caltex, and even bought out Shell by 1965. They 
also played their hands in logistical provision of rice (a staple food for the Indonesian 
people) through the Bulog (Badan Urusan Logistik or Logistic Affairs Body) (Ricklefs, 
2001). This meant that most of the country’s wealth were managed and held by a 
handful of the country’s elites.  
The disadvantaged position of the average person in Indonesia at that time can be seen 
in the relatively high levels of inequality measured through the Gini coefficient during 
the New Order regime (though, of course, many would argue that the inequality is even 
worse than those reflected in the Gini coefficient). Regardless of the blatant imbalance, 
the average Indonesians still had high hopes for the regime in terms of providing 
welfare for its people. They accepted that the elites had dominated the nation’s wealth, 
but many were reluctant to express much protest as the tantalizing promise of a better 
world was the main promise of the New Order regime.  
Many of the Indonesian people were also discouraged to protest as it was common 
knowledge that the New Order regime had not finished purging the nation of ideologies 
that were viewed to be in contrary to the ideologies set forth by the New Order. These 
were blatant in the imprisonment of various political leaders, many of them having been 
apprehended and were held without prior trial (Ricklefs, 2001). 
Nevertheless, Soeharto did not completely forsake the welfare of the people of 
Indonesia, considering the fact that Indonesia had a strong economic growth at that 
time. However, the system implemented at this time merely followed the path set in the 
previous regime which was more selective and mainly focused on the civil servants and 
members of the army (including a limited number of their families).  
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The Taspen (see previous section) was developed more fully with the issuance of Law 
Number 11 of 1969 regarding the Principles of Employment for Civil Servants which 
included a clause mandating that retired civil servants receive a monthly income 
through PT Taspen (previously called PN Taspen) (Suryahadi et al, 2014). Then in 
1971, the management of welfare and social security for military personnel was 
separated to form the Indonesian Armed Forces Insurance (Asuransi Angkatan 
Bersenjata Republik Indonesia or “Asabri”) (Suryahadi et al, 2014). 
Health insurance was also established through Presidential Decree Number 230 of 1968, 
where Soeharto mandated the establishment of a Healthcare Funds Agency (Badan 
Penyelenggara Dana Pemeliharaan Kesehatan or “BPDPK”) which demanded a 
compulsory contribution (Suryahadi et al, 2014). Due to various management and 
budgeting problems, the healthcare management was transferred to a newly established 
state-owned company (Perusahaan Umum Husada Bhakti) in 1984 by the issuance of 
Government Regulation Number 22 of 1984. In 1992, by Government Regulation 
Number 6 of 1992, Perusahaan Umum Husada Bhakti was converted into a limited 
liability company called PT ASKES (an acronym for Asuransi Kesehatan or Health 
Insurance), which allows flexibility in government spending for the healthcare system 
(Sejarah BPJS Kesehatan, 2013).  
In 1992, the Jaminan Sosial Tenaga Kerja (Workers’ Social Security Insurance or 
“Jamsostek”) was established through Law Number 3 of 1992, whereby not only the 
health was of concern but also work-accident insurance and pension plans were also 
covered (Sejarah BPJS Kesehatan, 2013). This program was opened for workers 
employed in the formal private sector as well, which expanded the scope of social 
security in Indonesia at that time. The concept of a universal social security coverage 
was not yet a focus of this regime. This program was managed by PT Jamsostek which 
was established through Government Regulation Number 36 of 1995, as a follow up of Law 
3/1992. Jamsostek offered benefits including health insurance, work accidents, old-age 
savings and death benefits. The rate of contribution varied from 5.7% of the employee’s 
salary for a provident fund, consisting of 3.7% employer contribution and 2% employee 
contribution, to 0.3 per cent of the salary for a death benefit grant (Suryahadi et al, 2014). 
Health was not the only focus for welfare of the New Order regime. By the 1980s, many 
of the population were beginning to be educated due to the creation of public schools. 
By 1984 approximately 97% of primary school age (between 7-12 years old) attended 
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school (Ricklefs, 2001). With this, literacy rates also continued to rise – marking 
approximately 80% of males and 63% of females to be literate (1980 Census, in 
(Ricklefs, 2001)). By 1990s, the literacy rates for males approached 90% and 80% for 
females (1990 Census, in (Ricklefs, 2001)). 
The periods 1997 to 1998 during the AFC saw many upheavals – lots of economic 
turmoil with the insolvency of various banks due to the loss of trust from its customers 
and high inflation rates. In 1998, the inflation rate even grew to 58.4% annual consumer 
prices (see Figure 6). The people of Indonesia were restless – they did not have the 
means to survive and they had lost faith in the suppressive government that they thought 
could have brought them to prosperity. With the strong political chaos, the New Regime 
were unable to rein in the ‘revolution’ that was bound to happen soon.  
Figure 10 – Unemployment Rate (% Total Economically Active Labour Force) at 
end of Soeharto Regime 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (2015) 
 
The currency fell to as low as 15% of its pre-crisis value in less than one year, the 
inflation rate soared by 78% (see Figure 6), the unemployment rate increased from 4.7 
per cent in August 1997 to 5.5 per cent in August 1998 (see Figure 10) (Suryahadi et al, 
2014).  
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The occurrences during the AFC also served as evidence that the social security system 
in operation at that moment was unable to cushion people from aggregate shocks. Many 
people were vulnerable to the risk of falling into poverty while minimal protection was 
provided only for the people who were covered by the system (Suryahadi et al, 2014). It 
was then apparent that approximately two thirds of the working population were not 
engaged in employment which made them eligible to receive benefits from the existing 
social security system due to their location (in the rural areas) and employment status 
(informal labour), hence they were extremely exposed to the risk of poverty. 
As a response to the AFC, the Indonesian government established the ad-hoc Social 
Safety Net Program (Jaringan Pengaman Sosial or “JPS”)34. The JPS (partially funded 
by the World Bank) included subsidies for rice, school scholarships and block grants, 
introduction of the health card (kartu sehat), provision of free access to public health 
services for the poor, labour-intensive work programs and the provision of grants to 
selected community groups (Sumarto et al. 2002; in Suryahadi et al, 2014). 
Soeharto then fell in May 1998 during the AFC after many groups, including the 
famous university students’ movement to occupy the parliament, demanded his 
resignation. 
Although in many cases Soeharto has contributed to the growth of the Indonesian 
economy, the strong grip he had on the political landscape did not create a conducive 
environment for a strong left-wing movement to grow. His influence went in so far that 
many of the people in Indonesia are left ignorant in their ideological choices. 
Nonetheless, his achievements in economic growth also helped lay down the 
foundations for a social security system and education of the people for the movement 
toward a more welfare-oriented state.  
 
                                                 
34
 The JPS was established under much pressure from the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank which urged Indonesia to implement the Structural Adjustment Program. This program included 
four objectives: i) stabilizing the exchange rate and prices and stimulating domestic demand through 
fiscal and monetary policy; (ii) bank and corporate restructuring; (iii) improving governance and 
increasing transparency and efficiency; and (iv) protection for the poor and preservation of human assets. 
It was this fourth point that triggered the initiation of the JPS (Mulyadi, 2013; in Suryahadi et al, 2014)) 
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Table 7 – Summary of conditions in Soeharto New Order Regime 
No. Year Economic and Social 
Developments 
Social Security Regimes Related Legislation 
1.  End of 
1960s 
- Soeharto managed to take over 
the reins on Indonesian 
government 
- Soekarno signed a letter 
mandating Soeharto to take all 
possible means to stabilise 
Indonesia 
- Soeharto implemented more 
‘foreign-friendly’ initiatives in 
terms of economy 
- No new social security regimes were 
introduced at this transition period 
- N/A 
2.  1970s to 
1980s 
- Soeharto’s economic policies 
seems more determined to allow 
economic growth 
- Welfare policies took a back seat 
during beginning due to focus on 
growth 
- Economic growth mostly due to 
oil boom and manufacture 
industries 
- Influx of people to urban areas, 
causing poverty and inequality 
issues 
- Taspen was expanded to include pension 
benefits for civil servants  
- Insurance and welfare benefits for military 
personnel were separated to form the Asabri 
- Establishment of Perusahaan Umum Husada 
Bhakti (later transformed into a limited 
liability company called PT ASKES) to 
manage a national health care fund 
- Introduction of lower school fees and 
government subsidies to encourage at least 
primary education 
- Law Number 11 of 1969 
regarding the Principles of 
Employment for Civil 
Servants 
- Government Regulation 
Number 45 of 1971 
regarding the 
Establishment of the 
Asabri 
- Presidential Decree 
Number 230 of 1968 
- Program Wajib Belajar 
1984 
3.  1990s - High economic growth due to 
more foreign-investor friendly 
economic policies which 
- Introduction of the Workers’ Social Security 
Insurance (Jamsostek) which covers all 
workers, including workers who are formally 
- Law Number 3 of 1992 
regarding Workers’ Social 
Security 
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encourage foreign direct 
investment in manufacture 
- High urbanisation rate where 
people start to move away from 
rural areas in search of better 
income 
 
employed in the private sector 
- Jamsostek includes health-care benefits in 
case of illness, work-related accidents, and 
compensation in case of death, even old-age 
savings. 
- Jamsostek rate of contribution approximately 
5.7% of employee’s monthly salary 
- Introduction of JPS as a response to AFC 
- JPS benefits include food and fuel subsides, 
provision of rice for poor families 
- Government Regulation 
Number 36 of 1995 
regarding the 
Establishment of PT 
Jamsostek 
Source – Author, compilation of various works (2015) 
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Chapter III 
 
The Welfare State in the New Indonesian Republic 
After the fall of Soeharto in 1998, B.J. Habibie temporarily took over the reins of 
Indonesia as an interim president. During his very short term, Habibie managed to make 
a register of existing trade unions at that time. He urged the issuance of Minister of 
Labour Regulation Number 5 of 1998 which lists the registered trade unions. It was not 
until 2000, under the auspices of then-president Abdurrahman Wahid (better known as 
Gus Dur) that the Indonesian government ratified ILO Convention number 87. This 
ratification was then followed by the promulgation of Law number 21 of 2000 regarding 
Trade Unions/Worker’s Unions, which regulated the formation, establishment, 
inauguration and general workings of trade unions.
35
 
This promulgation of a trade union law then led to the split of the FSPSI (Federasi 
Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia or All Indonesian Workers` Union), which then 
triggered the establishment of many other trade unions and trade union federations in 
Indonesia as we see it today. Indonesia now has one Central which is the Majelis 
Pekerja Buruh Indonesia, of which under it there are the three main confederations (the 
KSPSI/Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia, KSBSI/Konfederasi Serikat 
Buruh Seluruh Indonesia, and the KSPI/Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Indonesia), and 4 
non-confederation federations. KSPSI is the largest confederation by far, with 11 
federations affiliated to it and over 2 million members. In 2002, the Freidrich-Eibert 
Stiftung released a research of trade unions in Indonesia which stated that the trade 
unionisation rate is 9%, with over 8 million members. Considering that the Indonesian 
population is now approximately 240 million people (see Table 1), with approximately 
half of them within the working age population, and more than a third of them are 
formally employed (see Figure 2), the unionisation rate is still very low. 
Nevertheless, even with such a low unionisation rate, the trade union movements in 
Indonesia were able to add pressure to the government to establish a national universal 
social security system. However, until this point, only the existing social security 
programs were in place, and the highly troublesome and ad-hoc JPS was the social 
                                                 
35
 See: http://indoprogress.blogspot.com.br/2007/08/serikat-buruhserikat-pekerja-di.html accessed on 11 
November 2014 
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security program that took the centre stage. This messy arrangement then pushed the 
need for a more organised and universal form of social security to be established. The 
then president Gus Dur raised the issue to the Indonesian Parliament (Majelis 
Permusyawarahan Rakyat or “MPR”) in 2000. 
A. The New Social Security System in the New Indonesian Republic 
It was only in 2002, two years after this proposal by former president Gus Dur, that the 
Parliament accepted a proposal for the amendment of the Constitution to extend social 
security to cover the entire population. They amended Article 28H, Subsection 3, of the 
1945 Constitution which emphasized that: “Every person shall have the right to social 
security to develop oneself as a dignified human being”; and Article 34, Subsection 2, 
which stated that: “The state shall develop a social security system for all the people and 
shall empower the vulnerable and poor people in accordance with human dignity”. In 
the original Constitution, no article mentioned social security explicitly (Suryahadi et al, 
2014).  
A draft concept of the SJSN Law was completed in 2003 and submitted to the 
Parliament in early 2004. In 2004, under the auspices of President Megawati 
Soekarnoputri (the daughter of former president Soekarno), the Indonesian government 
enacted the SJSN Law, one day before the inauguration of elected president Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono. The draft was revised approximately 56 times before it was 
enacted in October 2004. One of the major debates in the deliberation process was on 
deciding the type of institution that would manage the national social security 
programmes, that is, whether it should be in the form of a state-owned enterprise or a 
public and non-profit legal entity (Suryahadi et al, 2014). The SJSN Law introduced the 
concept of a universal healthcare system through the Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional or 
‘JKN’ – this means that the JKN shall cover the entire population, in both the formal 
and informal sectors, and bringing them into the national social security system. 
Until the end of 2013, Indonesia was supported by three major social health insurance 
programs: the Jamkesmas (Jaminan Kesehatan Masyarakat/the government-financed 
health coverage program for the poor and near-poor); the Jamsostek Health (the social 
health insurance program for formal sector workers); and the Askes (the social health 
insurance program for civil servants). Nonetheless, the law only substantially came into 
force in 2014 with the implementation of the JKN. The BPJS Law declared the 
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transformation of PT Askes into Health BPJS. The Health BPJS began implementation 
of the JKN officially on 1 January 2014 with approximately 121.6 million participants, 
96.4 million of whom are participants (poor and near poor) whose premium is paid by 
the government (Penerima Bantuan Iuran or ‘PBI’), while the remainder are ex-
participants of Askes and Jamsostek Health (Marzoeki et al, 2014). 
Figure 11 - Current Urban Population (% Total Population) 
 
Source – World Development Indicators 
 
We can see that the democratization of Indonesia has also added to the pressure towards 
governments to provide social protection (Haggard, 2005; in Aspinall, 2014). 
Nonetheless, we must also consider the economic and social conditions of Indonesia at 
the time of implementation of this system. The urbanisation rate was quite steady and 
somehow not affected drastically by the AFC. It kept growing at a steady pace until 
almost 50% of the total population was considered as living in the urban areas. 
Although, of course, this number was still concentrated in the island of Java and other 
islands on the Western side of Indonesia.  
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Figure 12 - Current GDP Per Capita (current US$) 
 
Source – World Development Indicators 
 
Despite the growing GDP, the national poverty rate in Indonesia was still quite high. 
During the transition period post-Soeharto and the buffering period of the AFC, the 
percentage of the population living under poverty ranged between 24% to 18% (see 
Table 8). At the time of implementation of the SJSN Law in 2004, the percentage of the 
total population living in poverty was still 16.66% (Badan Statistik Indonesia, 2015). 
These people, of course, are those who are in higher need of a social security system to 
depend on. They are also the same people who have difficulties to access healthcare and 
other social security benefits due to economical disadvantages. Hence, these are the 
people that the Indonesian government must aid and/or subsidise in order to grant them 
with some modicum of welfare to ‘live in dignity’.  
We can also observe (see Table 8) that during the buffering period after the AFC, the 
percentage of the rural population who were under poverty was significantly higher than 
the percentage of the population under poverty in the urban areas. This also shows that 
there was an even greater need for a universal social security system which is able to 
cover the entire population, regardless of their location and profession. 
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Table 8 – Percentage of Poor Population (% of Total) 36 
Year 
Percentage of Poor Population (% of Total) 
Urban Rural Urban+Rural 
1998 21,92 25,72 24,2 
1999 19,41 26,03 23,43 
2000 14,6 22,38 19,14 
2001 9,79 24,84 18,41 
2002 14,46 21,1 18,2 
2003 13,57 20,23 17,42 
2004 12,13 20,11 16,66 
Source – Badan Pusat Statistik Indonesia (2015) 
At the time of promulgation of the SJSN Law in 2004, there already existed growing 
concerns about the number of people who would be eligible to receive the subsidies. We 
can see that approximately 17% of the population were living under poverty by 2004 
when the SJSN Law was first promulgated, and even still approximately 12% by 2011 
by the time the BPJS Law was promulgated (see Table 8 and Figure 13). This means 
that there is a definite need to subsidize approximately 30 million persons. This figure, 
however, does not yet include those who are dependent and/or are economically 
inactive. In 2011, the Government of Indonesia negotiated that there shall be more or 
less 86 million people who shall be covered by the government subsidy (see also Figure 
14). These are the people who qualify for a Penerima Bantuan Iuran (the `PBI` or 
Beneficiaries for Contribution Subsidy) – a form of subsidy in which the government 
shall pay for the required contribution fee instead of the person themselves.  
It must also be noted that part of the reason for reluctance of the Indonesian government 
to implement the SJSN was that in 2001, Indonesia underwent a decentralisation 
process which allowed a freer rein for local governments to regulate some major state 
functions, health being one of them (including its funding and infrastructure issues). By 
this time, Indonesia was a country with 34 provinces and approximately 500 districts, 
each of which had autonomies of varying degrees to manage their region. It raised the 
question of the division of roles of both the central and the local regional government 
(Suryahadi et al, 2014). 
                                                 
36
 The Indonesian Statistics Agency states that the poverty line is calculated based on the fulfillment of 
2100 kcal/day/person, of which it is divided into 52 main commodities such as rice, vegetables, milk, etc. 
This is then converted into prices, which is then used to measure the poverty line. 
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By 2008, the regional health-care systems were flourishing, as health-care was part of 
the package of affairs that can be managed directly by a regional government. This is 
largely due to the electoral politics in which many candidates promised free health-care 
for their constituents (Aspinall, 2014). Many of them also implemented health-care 
programs in an attempt to cover those who were not eligible to receive subsidies from 
the central government.  By the time of promulgation of the SJSN Law in 2004 and the 
time during the proposal of the BPJS regulation in 2010, approximately 350 local 
governments (provincial and district levels) have already implemented their own type of 
health-care system (Suryahadi et al, 2014). There are several examples of local 
governments successfully implementing their own health-care regimes. One example is 
of Gede Winasa, the district head of Jembrana which is one of the poorest districts in 
Bali. He introduced the Jembrana Health-Care Package in 2002 which offered to cover 
all registered residents of Jembrana, and provide general care, some forms of dental 
treatments and some sort of hospital stay care for the poor (Aspinall, 2014). Another 
example is Alex Noerdin, the head of the Musi Banyuasin district in South Sumatera. 
He managed to bring South Sumatra to 100% health insurance coverage by 2011, with 
approximately 55% of them covered by the residential health insurance scheme and 
38% by the Jamkesmas while the rest were covered by other programmes (Aspinall, 
2014). 
Since health-care made up a significant part of the SJSN, it clearly presented a problem 
in terms of governance. The SJSN Law, indeed, did not stipulate as to which level of 
government shall be responsible for the collection of contributions and the direct 
implementation of the SJSN. It also did not mention whether the existing local health-
care and social security benefits were to be abolished and replaced by the SJSN or not. 
Neither did it provide any information for the transitional period, if these local systems 
were, in fact, to be abolished. Even the Ministry of Health, which is responsible for the 
BPJS for Health, did not provide any transitional period or synchronisation plans in its 
plan to achieve universal coverage by 2019 (see Figure 14). The capital Jakarta, for 
example, also has its own health system and subsidies for education and family affairs 
(e.g. fuel subsidies, infant vaccinations). 
There were even several lawsuits filed against the central government by some district 
and provincial governments. Many of them claimed that the implementation of the 
SJSN Law violated the Decentralisation Law (Suryahadi et al, 2014). With this lack of 
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support from the local governments, amongst other controversies and concerns, it was 
no wonder that the Indonesian central government were somewhat reluctant to fully 
implement the SJSN at a national level.  
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Figure 13 – Percentage of Poor People by Province in Indonesia (2011) 
 
Source – Simpadu PNPM Mandiri, Ministry of National Development Planning (2011) 
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Source: Ministry of Health 
(2011) 
Figure 14 – Proposal for Universal Coverage by Indonesian Ministry of Health (2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Transfer of JPK Jamsostek, Jamkesmas,  Askes PNS, TNI Polri 
members to BPJS Health 
Expansion to Include Members in Micro, Small, Medium and Large Enterprises 
Collection of Initial 
Contribution 
Mapping of 
Enterprises & 
Socialisation 
Evaluation of Satisfaction Levels per 6 months 
Integration of members of Jamkesda and commercial insurance to BPJS Health  
Transfer of members 
from Armed Forces 
Annual Evaluation of benefits and services 
Synchronisation of Members info: JPK 
Jamsostek, Jamkesmas and Askes PNS/Sosial -- 
NIK 
Persons covered by Old Social 
Security System: 148,2 million  
111,6 million persons 
managed by BPJS Health 
60,07 mil. persons 
managed by others  
257,5 million persons 
(entire population) 
managed by BPJS Health 
Level of Satisfaction 
85% 
ACTIVITIES:  
Transfer, Integration, Expansion 
73,8 million persons not 
yet members 
90,4 million persons not yet 
members 
Supporting regulations 
from Armed Forces 
86,4 million PBI 
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As we can see from Figure 14 above, the transition from the social security and health-
care system implemented prior to the SJSN Law is a very complicated affair. Firstly, 
there must be a consolidation of data amongst the companies and agencies which are 
responsible for the implementation and distribution of funds in the old social security 
system. This includes a thorough transfer of data pertaining to the beneficiaries and 
members covered by the system, including the amounts and sources for contribution and 
their beneficiaries in terms of compensation receipt. This is proposed to have been done 
by the end of 2013 in order to make way for full implementation of the BPJS Health in 
early 2014. As we can see, by 2014 there are approximately 86.4 million persons 
subsidised in the PBI program and 111.6 million persons which were previously 
managed by the old social security system to be managed by the BPJS Health. 
Meanwhile, approximately 73.8 million members are basically not protected or 
managed by any social security system.  
After the implementation of the BPJS Health, there is still a matter of collecting data on 
the entire population, including those who were not covered in the old social security 
system. This presents many difficulties since Indonesia is vast and there are also 
logistical problems in terms of gaining access to remote areas. Thus far, the collection 
of data mostly relies on the active participation of those who would like to receive 
benefits from the BPJS Health, which is done through registration (whether in digital or 
manual form) to the BPJS Health, with the aid of local health-care providers.  
As to the question of social movements which encouraged the process of finally 
implementing the universal social security system in Indonesia, we must look to the 
formation of the Komite Aksi Jaminan Sosial (Action Committee for Social Security or 
“KAJS”). The KAJS was established after it was clear there was a certain unwillingness 
from the Indonesian government to put social security as a priority.  
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono rose as the President of Indonesia right after the issuance 
of the SJSN Law, and amongst the issues in his campaign were promises to continue 
and implement the universal social security system through the SJSN. His government 
avowed that this would be one of the top priorities, especially considering the fact that 
the SJSN Law stipulated a deadline. This deadline mandated that further actions and 
regulations regarding the SJSN must be implemented within five years after the 
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issuance of the SJSN Law which meant that a follow up should have been issued by 
2009.  
However, as we mentioned above, there was a certain reluctance from the government 
at that time, as is evident in the lack of initiative to formulate a draft regulation for the 
establishment of the BPJS until even the end of Yudhoyono’s first term as President. It 
was only toward the end of 2009 that the Parliament submitted a draft of the BPJS 
regulation to be discussed in Parliament with the stakeholders. However, there were 
several occasions where it was apparent that the executive was reluctant to accelerate 
the process, as may be observed by their absence in various discussion sessions 
(Tjandra, 2012).  
Many stakeholders and social movement groups perceived this reluctance and were 
driven to apply pressure for the acceleration of the implementation process of the SJSN. 
It was this determination that sparked the necessity to form a committee which aims to 
supervise and accelerate the social security reformation in Indonesia, thus the KAJS was 
formed. The KAJS was then formally established during a meeting facilitated by the 
Federation of Indonesian Metal Workers (Federasi Serikat Pekerja Metal Indonesia or 
“FSPMI”) in 6-8 March 2010 (Tjandra, 2012).  
The KAJS consists of various social groups, dominated by trade union movements. The 
residing presidium consisted of trade union leaders such as Said Iqbal and Timbul 
Siregar. The Trade Union Rights Centre, headed by Surya Tjandra, are also directly 
involved in the works of the KAJS. The strategy used by the KAJS was the organisation 
of mass actions to apply pressure on the Indonesian government, as well as the 
organisation of workshops and seminars to inseminate and advocate the implementation 
of the SJSN Law by means of establishment of the BPJS (Tjandra, 2012). 
Most notably, on 5 April 2010, the KAJS successfully organised a mass mobilisation of 
workers to demonstrate and protest in front of the Parliament building to apply pressure 
on the government to continue discussions on the SJSN and the BPJS.
37
 These actions 
successively continued throughout the month of April and culminated in a massive 
action on Labour Day, where approximately 150,000 workers gathered at the Bundaran 
                                                 
37
 This movement is crucial, considering that this session of the Parliament held on 5 April 2010 was 
conducted in order to take a decision on whether or not the Parliament and government should continue 
discussions and further the developments of the SJSN and BPJS regulations. Fortunately, due mostly to 
the pressure applied by workers, the Parliament reached a decision to continue the discussions (Tjandra, 
2012). 
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HI (a prominent landmark in the Jakarta are) and marched toward the Presidential 
Palace. The main agenda for these workers was the implementation of the SJSN and 
BPJS regulations (Tjandra, 2012). 
The KAJS also applied legal pressure to the government whereby they submitted a 
lawsuit against the government of Indonesia for their failure to implement the SJSN 
Law. This lawsuit included demands that the government should admit their failure and 
to immediately issue implementing regulations (in the form of implementing 
Presidential decrees and Ministerial regulations) to fully implement the SJSN through 
the BPJS. Finally, on 13 July 2011, the Central Jakarta District Court announced that 
the demands were reasonable and declared that the class action was accepted (Tjandra, 
2012).
38
  
It is clear, then, that what was initially a means to provide aid as a form of mitigation 
for effects of the AFC, in the end Indonesia was benefited by the establishment of a 
social security system which aims to cover her entire population. Regardless of the 
controversies which surrounded it, the fact is that Indonesia is on its way to 
implementing the SJSN Law as part of its attempt as a welfare state.  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, prior to 2004 the social security system in 
Indonesia merely covered those who were under formal employment, both in private 
and public services (see Table 9 for details). Participation was mandatory, and 
contributions were paid from the salaries of the worker involved, usually by direct 
deduction by the company or public agency. The services provided for them greatly 
depended on the service years and hierarchal level which the worker held. The rights of 
non-workers were generally not taken into consideration by that social security system 
(save the rights of the extremely poor who were covered in a separate system, and, later, 
the dependents of formal workers) (see Table 9). As also mentioned before, the 
Constitutional rights for the people to receive social security was not guaranteed until 
2004 with the amendment of the Constitution. 
We also know that by 2011, despite the successes in the Jamkesmas program (which 
covered approximately 32% of the total population), local healthcare programs 
                                                 
38
 The final decision was received in July 2013 through District Court Decision No. 
278/PDT.G/2010/PN.JKT.PST whereby it stipulated that aside from being obliged to fulfil the demands 
for implementation of the SJSN Law, the government (in this case, the President, Vice President and 8 
relevant ministers) must supply compensation for the claimants.  
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(covering an additional 14%), the Jamsostek program (covering approximately 2%), 
there was still more than 50% of the population that were not covered by any state-
funded insurance programs (Ministry of Health, 2011; in (Aspinall, 2014). This added 
to the urgency to prioritise universalising the existing healthcare program in Indonesia’s 
bid to achieve universal social security, of which this right was guaranteed by the 
Constitution since 2004. 
However, there was not a clear complete separation between the health care system and 
the general social security system which included the payment of pensions and death 
benefits. Hence, the development of the SJSN largely continued on this path whereby 
all these benefits are lumped together into the SJSN. It is for this reason that we are 
discussing the health care and social security system in this same section of this paper.  
Table 9 – Health Security Systems in Indonesia prior to SJSN39 
Categories Jamkesmas
40
 
(established 2005) 
Askes (established 
1960) 
Jamsostek 
(established 1992) 
Groups 
mandated 
Poor and the near-
poor  
Civil servants; retired 
civil servants; retired 
military personnel 
and veterans 
Private employers with 
>10 employees or pay 
salary >IDR1 million a 
month 
Number 
enrolled 
76.4 million 16.6 million 5.0 million 
Premium Rp 6,500 ($ 0.67) 
per capita per 
month 
2% of basic + 1% 
government; No 
ceiling 
3% of salary for 
bachelors; 
6% of salary for 
married employees; 
Ceiling IDR1 million 
per month (not changed 
since 1993) 
Contributor  Government 100% Employees 66%; 
employer 34%  
Employers 100% 
Carrier Ministry of Health PT Askes (for profit) PT Jamsostek (for 
profit) 
                                                 
39
 See Marzoeki et al (2014) for further details. 
40
 Previously Askeskin, Mutated into Jamkesmas in 2007 
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Categories Jamkesmas
40
 
(established 2005) 
Askes (established 
1960) 
Jamsostek 
(established 1992) 
Benefits Comprehensive; 
Drugs are covered 
if prescribed within 
formulary; No cost-
sharing 
 
Comprehensive, no 
specific exclusion; 
Drugs are covered if 
prescribed within 
formulary;  
Cost-sharing 
available when 
services fall outside 
basic benefit package 
Comprehensive; cancer 
treatment, cardiac 
surgery, hemodialysis, 
and congenital diseases 
are excluded;
41
 drugs 
are covered if 
prescribed within 
formulary; 
no cost-sharing 
Dependents  All family 
members 
Spouse + 2 children 
under 21 years who 
are not working and 
not married 
Spouse + 3 children 
under 21 years who are 
not working and not 
married 
Providers  All puskesmas and 
public hospitals 
and selected 
empanelled private 
hospitals 
Mostly contracted 
public health centers 
and public hospitals  
Mixed: public and 
private providers 
Provider 
payment 
mechanisms 
Fee for service at 
puskesmas; DRG 
for hospitals 
Special fee schedules 
for civil servants; 
extra billing 
depending on 
negotiated fees 
Fees are negotiated; 
extra billing depending 
on negotiated fees 
 
Source – Marzoeki et al (2014) 
The BPJS Regulation stipulated that there shall be two separate administrative bodies 
which shall manage the implementation of the social security programs: BPJS for 
Health and BPJS for Labour/Employment. Currently, only the social security for health 
has been implemented with the establishment of the BPJS for Health in early 2014. As 
previously mentioned, although there seems to be a clear division in terms of 
management between the healthcare and social security systems, many factors such as 
funding and membership are still mixed. Some affairs that were previously fully under 
the Jamsostek, for example, are shifted into the BPJS for Health (see Figure 15). 
The BPJS Law then stated that participation in the social security system is mandatory 
for all Indonesian citizens and all foreign persons who have resided in Indonesia for 
more than 6 months.
42
 The participation shall be implemented as mandatory for those 
who are under formal employment and voluntary for those who are not under formal 
                                                 
41
 Starting in 2012, Jamsostek expanded the benefit package to cover catastrophic cases as well. See 
Marzoeki et al (2014); Suryahadi et al (2014). 
42
 BPJS Law, Art. 14  
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employment. The method used to participate is the payment of a certain contribution to 
the BPJS.  
For BPJS shall provide social security coverage for the following programs: 
1. Pension Security (Jaminan Hari Tua or “JHT”); 
2. Health Security (Jaminan Pemeliharaan Kesehatan or “JPK”); 
3. Work-related Accident Security (Jaminan Kecelakaan Kerja or “JKK”); and 
4. Death Security (Jaminan Kematian or “JK”). 
As we previously mentioned, the government of Indonesia provides subsidies for people 
who are under the poverty line through the PBI program by paying the contribution 
required instead of the person itself. However, there is some controversy as to the 
definition of “poor”. The BPS uses the standard set by ILO in determining persons who 
fall under the category of “poor” in which a person earns less than the amount necessary 
to purchase foodstuffs which fulfil 2100 kcal/day.
43
  
Figure 15 – Transformation of SJSN 
 
Source – Suryahadi et al (2014) 
 
                                                 
43
 See Penduduk Indonesia Hasil SP 2010, Badan Pusat Statistik Indonesia. 2013. Note that the trade 
unions, through the KAJS, were using a different form of measurement, accounting for a larger number of 
dependents that a beneficiary has to also accommodate. This is one of the reasons that sparked the 
controversy between the KAJS and the Indonesian government. 
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Through the JKN under the BPJS for Health, the contribution for the PBI recipients 
(poor and near poor paid by the government) is IDR 19,225 per person/per month; and 
for ex-Askes participants is 5% of their salary (3% paid by the employer and 2% paid 
by the employee themselves). For other formal sector workers, the contribution is 4.5% 
of their salary (4% paid by the employer and 0.5% paid by the employee themselves) 
until 30 June 2015 - after which the contribution will increase slightly to 5% of their 
salary (4% paid by the employer and 1% paid by the employee).
44
 For the informal 
sector or those who are not eligible to be considered as formal workers under contract 
(this can include informal workers, dependents of formal workers, etc), the contribution 
varied according to the choice of services: Rp 25,500 (class 3), Rp 42,500 (class II), and 
Rp 59,500 (class 1) (Marzoeki et al, 2014). 
The Indonesian government aims to achieve universal coverage for health care by 2019 
(BPJS, 2011) and universal social security coverage by 2029 (Suryahadi et al, 2014). 
The Economist (in Aspinall, 2014) mentioned that the SJSN will see Indonesia 
“building the biggest ‘single payer’ national health scheme – where one government 
outfit collects the contributions and foots the bills – in the world.”  
However, we can also measure the commitment of the Indonesian government to 
implement a universal social security program through the amount of funds that is set 
aside in the national budget. We can see that in 2015, social protection and health 
expenditures make up merely 2.1% of the total central government expenditure (see 
Figure 16) when the Indonesian Constitution of 1945 mandated that at least 20% of the 
National Expenditure should be spent on welfare.  
Unfortunately, Indonesia has not yet ratified ILO Convention No. 102 pertaining to 
International Social Security Standards, hence there is little that the international 
community can do to try and reinforce the urgency for universal social security. 
Regardless, some of the elements emphasised by the Convention has been integrated 
into the current SJSN. SJSN itself is an attempt to improve the previous health-care 
systems but it also aims to integrate other social security benefits as well. 
                                                 
44
 This type of contribution caused much controversy, even amongst the trade union movements. Prior to 
the SJSN, employees were not required to contribute and that 2% of their salary which was taken as 
contribution was solely the responsibility of the employer. Regardless of having a more universal 
coverage and largely better benefits, many trade union members are still skeptical as to the 
implementation of the SJSN. Nonetheless, the majority of them (especially those who participate in the 
KAJS) still support the implementation of the SJSN to replace the old Jamsostek system. See (Suryahadi 
et al, 2014). 
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In terms of other benefits such as work accident (also referred to as JKK) and death 
insurance (also referred to as JKM), the Indonesian government recently issued an 
implementing regulation to the BPJS for Labour in July 2015 by virtues of Government 
Regulation Number 44 of 2015 regarding Work Accident Insurance, Number 45 of 
2015 regarding Pensions and Number 46 regarding Old-Age Security.   
Relating to the benefits provided for work accidents, Government Regulation 44/2015 
provides that workers shall be classified into 5 categories according to the degree of risk 
that they are exposed to. These categories shall then determine the amount of 
contribution that each employee must contribute to the work accident security system. 
The following are details of such categories and their corresponding contributions are as 
follows:
45
 
a.  Category I  - Very low risk : 0.24% 
b.  Category II  - Low risk : 0.54% 
c.  Category III   - Medium risk : 0.89% 
d.  Category IV  - High risk : 1.27% 
e.  Category V  - Very high risk : 1.74% 
Workers in Category I include workers such as confectioners, government workers, 
traders, social workers and even textile workers. Workers in Category II include 
workers in the agriculture sector such as tobacco farmers and coffee plantation workers, 
but also include workers such as workers in the tourism sector including hoteliers, 
restaurant workers, and even cinema workers. Meanwhile, Category III presents 
workers such as workers in the fishing industry, the food industry (packaged foods), as 
well as pharmaceuticals. Workers in Category IV include workers in the production of 
alcohol and spirits, the provision of gas, cement factories, even including off-shore sea 
fishing. Further, Category V provides includes workers with very high-risk professions 
such as transportation of goods and persons by sea and air, mining of various metals, 
construction and also includes workers working in the production of explosives. An 
exhaustive list of the categories are listed in Annex I of Government Regulation 
44/2015. Meanwhile, persons who receive income that are not wage (those who are self-
employed, for example) shall pay contributions in relation to their income per month, 
ranging from IDR 10,000 (US$0.70) to IDR 207,000 (US$18). An exhaustive list of the 
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 See Art. 16(1) and Art. 25 of Government Regulation Number 44 of 2015 
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proportions of contributions to be made are listed in Annex II of Government 
Regulation 44/2015. 
The benefits received from this work accidents insurance includes emergency care, 
intensive care, medical expenses (including costs for medicine and doctors), temporary 
disability compensation (paid in case of inability to work), subsidies for prosthetics 
(when necessary), and even scholarships for the employee’s children in the event that 
the worker is no longer able to work due to permanent injury or even death. The 
scholarship given to the child(ren) of the employee shall be IDR 12,000,000 
(approximately equivalent to US$1000). 
Government Regulation 44/2015 also provides death insurance in the event of a death
46
 
of the worker that is not due to any working conditions or that did not occur within 
working circumstances. The employers are obliged to pay 0.5% of the employee’s 
monthly salary to contribute to this fund. In case of death, the beneficiary heir of the 
employee shall be entitled to receive approximately IDR 16,000,000 (roughly 
US$1400) as compensation of death. Then a further payment of IDR 4,800,000 
(approximately equivalent to US$400) shall be made in 24 installments of IDR 200,000 
(roughly US$20) per month. Funeral payments shall also be granted in the amount of 
IDR 3,000,000 (around US$220). As previously mentioned, the children of the deceased 
shall be entitled to a scholarship of IDR 12,000,000 (approximately equivalent to 
US$1000) if the deceased has paid contributions for at least five years. 
In relation to the pension plans, Government Regulation 45/2015 supersedes the 
previous pension system implemented prior to the SJSN. With the issuance of 
Government Regulation 45/2015, pension benefits include retirement pension, old-age 
pension, disability pension, widower pension, child pension and parent pension. The 
beneficiaries of these pensions are the employee themselves (in the event that they reach 
pension age or are rendered disabled prior to the pension age), one widow of the 
employee, a maximum of 2 children of the employee and one parent of the employee. 
Those who are eligible to participate in the Pension Plan are waged workers.  
The pension benefit received shall be calculated on the Pension Benefit Formula as 
follows:
47
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 See Art. 18, Art. 19, and Art. 34 of Government Regulation Number 44 of 2015 
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 See Art. 17 of Government Regulation Number 45 of 2015 
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(
1% × 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
12 
) × (
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒48
12 
) 
The above formula shall be used to calculate the first year worth of benefits to be 
received by the beneficiaries, while subsequent years will use the above formula in 
addition to an indexation of general inflation. Government Regulation 45/2015 
continues on to stipulate that for the first time, the minimum pension benefit to be 
received shall be IDR 300,000 (roughly US$25), while the maximum pension benefit to 
be received shall be IDR 3,600,000 (roughly US$280).
49
 These benefits shall be 
received every month. 
Employees who are entitled to receive pension benefits are employees who have 
contributed for at least 15 years and are of pension age or have opted to receive pension 
benefits. The initial pension age is determined to be 56 years old for the first 4 years of 
implementation of the Pension Plan. As of 1 January 2019, the pension age is 
determined as 57 years old, and will be increased for 1 year every 3 years until the 
pension age is determined at 65 years old.  
Widows and children shall more or less be entitled to 50% of the Pension Benefit if the 
employee passed away at a time when such employee is entitled to receive Pension 
Benefits. The parent of such employee shall be entitled to 20% of the Pension Benefit in 
the same event.  
The amount of contribution that must be paid is currently a total of 3% of the 
employee’s monthly salary, of which 2% is paid by the employer and 1% is paid by the 
employee. This amount is proposed to be increased annually until it reaches a 
contribution of 8% of the employee’s monthly salary. The maximum basis of wage that 
can be used to calculate the contribution is IDR 7,000,000 per month (approximately 
equivalent to US$650), but shall be annually adjusted according to the GDP. 
Furthermore, under Government Regulation Number 46 of 2015, Old-Age Security ( 
also known as JHT) is defined as a one-time payment in cash of a certain amount of 
money in the event that the employee enters pension age, passes away, or sustains 
permanent injury causing disability. Those who are eligible to participate in the Old-
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 The average annual wage shall be calculated as the average wage received during the years of servisse 
up to the pension age 
49
 Ibid Art. 18 
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Age Security are all Indonesian nationalities, and foreigners who have stayed in 
Indonesia for more than six months. 
The amount of contribution to be paid for the JHT is a total of 5.7% of the employee’s 
salary – of which 2% shall be paid by the employee and 3.7% shall be paid by the 
employer. For those who are not under formal employment and wish to also participate 
in the JHT program, the contributions to be paid are fixed according to the amount of 
income that they receive each month. The lowest possible voluntary contribution is IDR 
20,000 (approximately US$ 1.5) and the highest possible contribution to be paid is IDR 
414,000 (roughly US$35), as detailed in Annex I of Government Regulation 46/2015.  
The JHT can be disbursed once the person has reached the age of 56 years old. The 
amount to be disbursed shall be the amount that has been paid by the person to the 
BPJS, including any of its interests as recorded in the personal account of the 
participant. The funds may be disbursed early on the pretense of preparation for 
pension, with the condition that the participant has paid the funds for more than ten 
years, as well as on the condition that only a maximum of 40% may be disbursed for the 
purposes of house-purchase, and a maximum of 10% may be disbursed for 
miscellaneous purposes.
50
 This disbursement can be paid out to the participant’s 
beneficiaries (widow, children or parent) in case of death of the participant.  
We can see that the most recent developments in the SJSN scheme, especially 
pertaining to the JHT, JKK, and JKM as well as the Pension Plan will create an even 
more complex scheme for Indonesian social security. It aims to provide a more 
comprehensive form of protection, mainly aiming at universality, which will minimise 
the risk of any part of the population falling through the cracks. Of course, as it is newly 
implemented, the results of this system is as yet to be seen. Concerns have been raised 
as to the effectiveness and burdensome nature of the contribution system, yet what the 
exact consequences are remains to be seen. 
Nonetheless, we are already able to see that there are still gaps in which the government 
has yet been able to fulfil. These gaps are generally filled by the communal and 
extended family systems ‘granted’, which generally only apply for the people who live 
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 Please note that this particular Art.22 of Government Regulation 46/2015 has hailed much controversy 
in Indonesia due to the fact that the previous system allowed early disbursement at any time and without 
any maximum amount. Hence, this Regulation is currently being recalled for further revision by the 
Indonesian government after much pressures from labour and social movements. 
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in the rural area (regardless of which, the extended family system are still somewhat 
existent even in the urban areas). However, those living in the urban areas, especially in 
the more metropolitan centre of Jakarta, have essentially lost the communal protection 
that is so rampant in the rural areas. There is also still a strong reliance for the 
employers to have the capacity and willingness to provide the majority contribution for 
coverage. 
However, regardless of a seeming reluctance in implementation and other economic and 
social obstacles, we can see that the Indonesian government is putting great effort to 
build a welfare state. Firstly, it made way for democratisation (as discussed in Chapter 
I). This is significant as democratisation in itself paved a way for a larger participation 
of stakeholders in the decision-making processes of the Indonesian government. We can 
see that there is room for more actors, including new political parties, social movements 
and even organised labour movements (Aspinall, 2014). These actors are crucial as they 
helped to encourage and pressurise the Indonesian government to promulgate and 
implement social policies which benefit the welfare of the Indonesian people instead of 
merely aiming for economic growth. We can also see that democratisation has led to a 
more open government which somehow aims to please the popular demands of the 
people they manage. This is especially visible in the regional government where many 
of the elected leaders aimed or at least promised for some modicum of welfare for the 
people. Hence, Indonesia has begun to create a more conducive platform for the 
development of a welfare state, with high economic growth and a stable condition of 
democracy.  
B. Developments of Education in Indonesia 
In the discussion of a welfare state, we shall, of course, be obliged to discuss matters 
regarding the development of the people themselves. It is a belief that one can attempt 
to escape from the poverty trap through education. Education policies and incentives are 
almost always an important feature in the welfare state landscape. 
Education policies in Indonesia has relatively improved over the years, as may be 
observed by the increasing number of participation in the primary and secondary school 
levels. This is mainly due to policies implemented by the Indonesian government, 
urging the mandatory school years. Initially mandatory attendance to school was only 
obligatory for the first six years of primary education. The number then gradually 
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increased to nine years and the current government has proposed it to twelve years of 
primary and secondary education
51
. 
The mandatory 6-year school attendance was implemented in 1984, as part of 
Soeharto’s plans to educate people in order to prepare them to enter the labour market. 
The plan was then enhanced to allow a mandatory 9-year school attendance, which was 
implemented through the National Education System Law of 2003 which mandated that 
children of 7 to 15 years of age are obliged to attend school. With the introduction of 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), Indonesia was pressurised to implement a 
12-year universal obligatory education. This is still a work in progress, whereby the 
government still faces challenges such as the provision of teachers and facilities as well 
as the funding thereof.
52
 
However, in order to understand the improvements of educational indicators in 
Indonesia, we must take a look at Table 10 below. 
Table 10 – Education Indicators in Indonesia 
Education Indicators 1998 1999 2008 2009 2010 
PARTICIPATION IN FORMAL 
EDUCATION (by age)      
School Participation Rate (SPR) 7-12 years 95.06 95.34 97.83 97.95 97.97 
School Participation Rate (SPR) 13-15 years 77.16 79.04 84.41 85.43 86.11 
School Participation Rate (SPR) 16-18 years 49.28 51.14 54.70 55.05 55.83 
School Participation Rate (SPR) 19-24 years 12.10 12.70 12.43 12.66 13.67 
  
     
PARTICIPATION IN FORMAL AND NON 
FORMAL EDUCATION (by age)      
School Participation Rate (SPR) 7-12 years N/A N/A 97.88 97.95 98.02 
School Participation Rate (SPR) 13-15 years N/A N/A 84.89 85.47 86.24 
School Participation Rate (SPR) 16-18 years N/A N/A 55.50 55.16 56.01 
School Participation Rate (SPR) 19-24 years N/A N/A 13.29 12.72 13.77 
  
     
Educational Attainment Population Aged 15 
Years and Over      
                                                 
51
 See 
http://edukasi.kompas.com/read/2015/01/13/01183401/Puan.Maharani.Wajib.Belajar.12.Tahun.Dimulai.J
uni.2015 where the current Coordinating Minister of Human and Cultural Development, Puan Maharani 
(former President Megawati Soekarnoputri’s daughter), announced that the policy implemented by the 
former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was to be implemented by June 2015. 
52
 See http://pendis.kemenag.go.id/index.php?a=detilberita&id=7065#.VXWwpM9Viko as to statements 
from the Ministry of Religious Affairs regarding the policies of the Ministry of Education, referring to 
challenges and criticisms. 
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Not/Never Attending School 11.54 11.23 8.24 7.50 7.28 
Not completed Primary School 19.49 18.71 14.98 14.86 12.74 
Primary Education (SD/MI/equivalent) 33.16 32.57 29.08 29.31 29.72 
Lower Secondary Education 
(SMP/MTs/equivalent) 
16.27 16.97 20.23 19.85 20.57 
Secondary Education and above 
(SM/equivalent +) 
19.55 20.51 27.46 28.49 29.69 
  
     
Illiteracy Rate 
     
Illiteracy Rate Population Aged 10 years + 10.58 10.21 6.95 6.59 6.34 
Illiteracy Rate Population Aged 15 years + 12.11 11.63 7.81 7.42 7.09 
Illiteracy Rate Population Aged 15-44 years 5.15 4.63 1.95 1.80 1.71 
Illiteracy Rate Population Aged 45 years + 29.74 28.83 19.59 18.68 18.25 
Source – Badan Pusat Statistik Indonesia 2014 
From Table 10 above, we can see that there is apparent increase in school participation 
rate, approaching 100% participation for those who are obliged to attend school. We can 
also see that there is a decrease in the percentage of the population which have never or 
is not currently attending school. Illiteracy rates have also steadily decreased.  
In terms of commitment to educational programs, the Indonesian Constitution mandated 
that at least 20% of the National Budget shall be spent on education and education-
related expenditures
53
. However, according to the 2015 Indonesian Budget Proposal, the 
education sector is only eligible to receive approximately 10.5% of the overall Budget 
(Ministry of Finance, 2014. 
The following are details of the Indonesian National Central Government Budget for 
2015 (Ministry of Finance, 2014): 
 
1. Environment (Lingkungan Hidup) : 0.8%; 
2. Social Protection (Perlindungan Sosial): 0.6%; 
3. Housing and Public Facilities (Perumahan dan Fasilitas Umum): 1.5%; 
4. Health (Kesehatan): 1.5%; 
5. Security and Discipline (Ketertiban dan Keamanan): 3.3%; 
6. Defence (Pertahanan): 7.0%; 
7. Economy (Ekonomi): 10.3%; 
8. Education (Pendidikan): 10.5%; 
9. Public Service (Pelayanan Umum): 64%; 
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 See Article 31(4) of the Indonesian Constitution 1945 
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10. Tourism and Creative Economy (Pariwisata dan Ekonomi Kreatif): 0.1%; and 
11. Religion (Agama): 0.4% 
From these percentages, the Indonesian government has implemented a program called 
Bantuan Operasional Sekolah (School Operational Aid or “BOS”). This program was 
fully implemented as a follow up of the National Education System Law issued in 2003. 
This program has allowed Indonesia to attain its target of nearly 100% participation in 
primary and secondary schools by the end of 2005 (BOS Program, 2012). 
Figure 16 – Indonesia Central Government State Budget Proposal 2015 
 
Source - Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia 
The BOS funding was intended for the following (Program Bantuan Operasional 
Sekolah, 2012): 
1. The waiver of school operational fees for all students attending public SD/SDLB 
(primary education, until year 6) and public SMP/SMPLB/SMPT (secondary 
education, up until year 9), excluding those for international-grade schools; 
2. The waiver of all fees in any type or form for all poor students, both in public 
and private schools; and 
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3. The alleviation of expenditures of school operational funds for students in 
private schools. 
With the above policy, the students only need to pay a small fee to enter the public 
schools. Some public schools are even able to provide free education as the operational 
costs of the school do not exceed the subsidies provided by the government. The 
amount that the students pay (if any), of course, varies from school to school. 
This program (according to 2012 budgets) allows for the following funds to be received 
by each student (Program Bantuan Operasional Sekolah, 2012): 
1.  SD/SDLB  Rp 580.000,-/student/year 
2.  SMP/SMPLB/SMPT  Rp 710.000,-/student/year 
This would be equivalent to approximately US$50 per student per annum for students in 
the primary education and approximately US$65 per student per annum for students in 
the secondary education.  
When compared to the regional expenditure, it seems as if Indonesia has not yet 
committed to education as much as its neighbour Thailand which has committed 
approximately 30% of her government expenditure  on education (as may be seen in 
Figure 17 below). Nonetheless, Indonesia seems to be making better efforts (in terms of 
budgeting) than, say, India – India also has a large population, most of which do not 
have access to formal education.  
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Figure 17 – Regional Education Expenditure (% of Government Expenditure) 
 
Source - World Bank Indicators 2015 
 
Even when we analyse the commitment of Indonesia toward education from the 
expenditure as a percentage of the GDP, the analysis does not take such a different road. 
We see that Thailand still holds high in terms of spending nearly 8% of its GDP on 
education by 2013, meanwhile Indonesia merely allows 3% (see  
Figure 18 below). Bangladesh ranks lower in terms of percentage of GDP, but is also 
not far off from Indonesia, spending only approximately 2% of its GDP on education.  
Although, if we compare it to the average expenditure of East Asian & Pacific countries 
(comparison of developing countries only), it is shown that Indonesia has a higher 
spending rate in terms of its percentage of government expenditures. However, in terms 
of percentage of GDP, it seems that Indonesia is not showing such a strong commitment 
compared to the average East Asian & Pacific countries.  
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Figure 18 – Regional Education Expenditure (% of GDP) for East Asia & the 
Pacific 
 
Source - World Bank Indicators 2015 
 
From the above presented data, it may be concluded that although there seems to be an 
improving trend in Indonesian education, especially in terms of participation, this 
commitment has not yet been backed up with sufficient funding. Hence, regardless of 
having policies which oblige young Indonesians to enter into school, there are still 
setbacks for people who are living under poverty and do not have access to or have been 
denied government subsidies. There is not yet a policy which enables universal 
education for all, without contribution or with affordable contribution. 
C. Other Social Policies 
When analysing a welfare state, there are other factors which are also important to 
explore. This includes matters such as the role of women and gender equality, the 
existence of social policies which allow full empowerment of women (such as the 
existence of daycare programs), and even nursing home programs for the elderly. In this 
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case, the Indonesian government has implemented several programs for the care of 
young children and the elderly, mainly through the Ministry for Social Affairs.  
Since 2004, these ministries have worked together to create institutions and 
rehabilitation centers in order to facilitate the movements of society. Amongst these 
institutions developed are those finalised by the Ministry for Social Affairs through the 
Minister of Social Affairs Decision Number 50/HUK/2004, which include the 
establishment of Social Rehabilitation Center for: 
1. Abandoned and/or Orphaned Children (Panti Sosial Asuhan Anak);  
2. Disabled Persons (Panti Sosial Bina Daksa); 
3. Mentally Retarded Persons (Panti Sosial Bina Grahita); 
4. Homeless Persons (Panti Sosial Bina Karya); 
5. Mentally Psychotic Persons (Panti Sosial Bina Laras); 
6. Persons with Visual Defficiency (Panti Sosial Bina Netra); 
7. Persons with Audio and Verbal Defficiency (Panti Sosial Bina Rungu Wicara); 
8. Women formerly engaged in commercial sex trade (Panti Sosial Karya Wanita); 
9. Former Delinquent Children (Panti Sosial Marsudi Putra); 
10. Former Drug Abusers (Panti Sosial Pamardi Putra); 
11. Children with Learning Defficiency (Panti Sosial Petirahan Anak); and 
12. Persons in Old-Age (Panti Sosial Tresna Werdha). 
All the above Rehabilitation Centers are subject to the management and funding of the 
Ministry of Social Affairs. Unfortunately, the financial reports of the Indonesian central 
government does not provide any information regarding the amount distributed to these 
Rehabilitation Centers and thus we are unable to determine their significance. 
Nevertheless, we can appreciate the fact that these institutions even exist at all, although 
they are relatively newly established. 
In terms of child care policies, the Indonesian central government in 2012, through the 
Ministry of Social Affairs, in cooperation with the Coordinating Minstry of People’s 
Welfare issued Minister of Social Affairs Regulation Number 02 of 2012 regarding 
Child Care where it established Child Care Institutions. The children who are eligble to 
be entered into this Child Care Institution are children from the age of three months to 
the age of eight years old. The role of these particular childcare institutions (which are 
more like daycares in nature) are to temporarily take over the role of the parents, 
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especially those whose parents work during the day and are unable to take care of their 
children during these periods. 
In terms of funding for the establishment of these Institutions, the Child Care 
Regulation stipulates that it shall be sourced from the central and regional government’s 
budget. It also stipulates that there is possibility for external donations to be made for 
the establishment of these Institutions but it does not limit precisely how and how much 
these donations can be made. Bear in mind that this regulation was not issued for the 
purpose of establishment of Child Care Institutions per se, as many had already existed 
under the Ministry of Social Affairs some time before the issuance of the 2012 Child 
Care Regulation. Unfortunately, data regarding the actual number of daycare 
institutions, their funding as well as the number of children in this system are as of yet 
unknown. 
However, there is some data regarding childcare for children whose parents are not 
present or are present but are unable to raise their children, either due to financial 
disabilities or even unwillingness. For example, a report issued in 2007 by the Unicef in 
cooperation with the Save the Children UK and the Ministry of Social Affairs of the 
Republic of Indonesia mentioned that the Indonesian government distributed some 
subsidies, beginning in 2001 as part of the Government Subsidy Program for Additional 
Food Costs for Social Care Institutions, which was in turn part of the Central 
Government aid to mitigate high prices due to the decrease of fuel subsidies (Martin et 
al, 2007). This report mentioned that by 2007, the subsidy amounted to more than IDR 
105.2 billion (equivalent to approximately US$ 11.69 million) disbursed by the Central 
Government. This subsidy was provided for the care of an approximate total of 128,016 
children across Indonesia. The subsidy was granted using a calculation of a daily 
subsidy per child of IDR 2,300 (approximately US$ 0.20) for a 365-day year, which in 
total amounts to approximately IDR 839,000 per child per annum (Martin et al, 2007). 
To give some kind of approximate real life terms, the IDR 2,300 granted for each child 
would buy one meal with rice, some vegetable soup and a piece of tofu. 
Unfortunately, more recent data regarding the actual number of active government-
owned or government-funded childcare institutions are unknown.  
In terms of the role of women in the society, according to the 2015 Indonesian Labour 
Market Indicator Report issued by the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics, there are 
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approximately 50 million women who are economically active out of circa 92 million 
women who are of working age. This means that around half of the female population 
who are of working age do not generate income for their household. Out of the 
remaining 42 million, approximately 30 million are women who are housekeepers. This 
number is appalingly high when compared to the number of economically inactive 
males. For example, there are only approximately 14 million males who are inactive, 
and only roughly 1 million of them are housekeepers. Aside from the blatant gender 
inequality, this also means that there are more women who stay at home and take care 
of domestic affairs, and thus lessens slightly the necessity for the establishment of day-
care for children. 
In terms of protection provided under the Indonesian Labour Law, some specific 
policies are provided in relation to handicapped persons, children and women. Law 13 
of 2003 regarding Labour stipulates that employers of handicapped persons are obliged 
to provide protection in consideration of the degree and type of such employee’s 
physical handicap.
54
 Indonesia has also ratified the ILO Convention No. 182 on the 
worst forms of child labour and has thus incorporated it into the Indonesian Labour 
Laws. Hence, specific requirements must be met in order to employ children who are 
less than 13 years of age. These requirements include
55
: 
a. written consent of the parents or guardians of the child must be obtained; 
b. written agreement between the employer and the parents or guardians must be 
made; 
c. the child shall not work for more than 3 hours per day; 
d. the work must be conducted during the day time and not hinder school 
attendance; 
e. safe and healthy working conditions must be ensured; 
f. the employment relation must be perceptible; and 
g. the salary must be paid according to the prevailing laws and regulations. 
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 See Law 13 of 2003, Art. 67 
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 See Ordonantie No.9 of 1949 on the Restriction on Child Employment (Staatsblad of 1949 No.8); 
Section 7A Book III of the Indonesian Civil Code; ILO Convention No.182 as ratified by the Indonesian 
Government by Law No.1/2000 dated 8 May 2000 
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The protection of women
56
 provides that women who are under the age of 18 shall not 
be permitted to work between 23.00 to 07.00, hence supposedly reducing the risk of 
exposure to harassment or over-exertion. Employers who wish to employ women 
between 23.00 and 07.00 must provide transportation to and from the work place, and 
must also provide nutritious foods. Employers are also obliged to permit women to 
breastfeed during work hours. Maternity leave of a total of approximately 3 months is 
also permitted for pregnant women; however, women who have suffered a miscarriage 
shall only be permitted to take leave for 1.5 months. Women are also allowed to take 2 
days of menstrual leave at each month.  
Although still very far from having comprehensive systems, the Indonesian government 
has taken steps toward the provision and improvement of welfare, especially for those 
who are marginalised in societies. Analyses regarding the quality and significance of 
these programs, however, are material of other discussions and shall not be the focus of 
this paper.  
D. Current Indonesian Social and Economic Structures 
In order to understand what kind of welfare state currently exists and what is possible in 
Indonesia, we need to analyse what the economic and social conditions are of the 
current days. We have touched a little bit of this in the section discussing developments 
in the historical section of this paper, however, this section shall analyse deeper the 
latest available data, wherever possible. This is necessary in order to determine 
precisely what type of welfare state Indonesia is developing. 
This section shall discuss matters of average wage, urbanisation, employment and other 
similar indicators. We will start off with discussions regarding the labour market 
conditions in Indonesia, as of the most current update available to us. If we look at 
Table 12 below, we can see that there are only approximately 120 million persons out of 
roughly 250 million persons that are economically active. This means that less than half 
of the population engage in activities which have the possibility to gain some form of 
income. If we analyse further, we see that merely 69.5% of these people are employed 
and are somehow guaranteed to have a form of income (regardless of how much the 
income is). Hence, the logic follows that these people are the ones that shall be 
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 See Section 7A Book III of the Indonesian Civil Code; ILO Convention No.100/1951 as ratified by the 
Indonesian Government by Law No.80/1957 on Equality between Female and Male Employees dated 19 
December 1957 
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responsible to shoulder the burden to contribute to the social funds. Of course, not all of 
these people have sufficient income to do so, which means that it is safe to conclude 
that there would be less people to rely on to be able to contribute to social funds.  
If we look even further, we can see in Figure 20 that a further 17 million people who are 
unpaid workers and thus can be deducted from the count of people who are able to 
contribute to the social funds. In fact, it would even be safe to assume that in the worst 
case scenario, only approximately 50 million people who are employees or are self-
employed can be considered as those with guaranteed monthly income and are able to 
contribute to the social funds.  
Table 11 – Working Age Population According to Industry (2015) 
Main Industry Number of Workers 
Agriculture, Forestry, Hunting and Fishery 40.122.816 
Mining and Quarrying 1.420.917 
Manufacturing 16.382.756 
Electricity, Gas and Water 311.834 
Construction 7.714.384 
Wholesale, Retail, Restaurant and Hotels 26.647.168 
Transportation, Storage and Communication 5.192.181 
Financing, Insurance, Real Estate and Business Services 3.643.881 
Community, Social and Personal Services 19.410.884 
Source – Badan Pusat Statistik Indonesia (2015) 
Figure 19 – Working Age Population According to Industry (2015) 
 
Source – Statistics Indonesia (2015) 
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From this labour market structure, we can already see that there is a difficulty in relying 
on merely one fifths of the entire population to contribute to the social welfare. 
However, we must also bear in mind that quite a significant number of this population is 
supported through government subsidies such as the PBI system for the SJSN 
program.
57
 
If we understand correctly the interpretations of Table 12 and Table 13, as well as their 
corresponding Figure 19 and Figure 20, there are several conclusions that we are able to 
draw. Firstly, that the Indonesian labour market is quite large in terms of its population 
(see Table 12). Secondly, that the market is still segmented, but the most significant of 
this is still in the agriculture and fisheries, where approximately one third of the work 
force is engaged in this sector (see Table 13 and Figure 19). Thirdly, that there is a 
significant increase over the last three or four years in the number of people obtaining 
jobs in the service and manufacturing sector, regardless of the still high number of 
workers who work in agriculture (see Table 13). Finally, the fourth conclusion that we 
can draw is that even though there are still more employees, both in the rural and urban 
areas, compared to the number of persons who are casually employed or are unpaid 
family workers (see Figure 20). 
In terms of the Indonesian tax structure, one of the most obvious examples we can draw 
is the taxation system for income. According to the Indonesian taxation law, personal 
income taxes are regulated at a progressive rate, whereby the tax rate applicable are as 
follows: 
a. for an income of up to IDR 50 million per annum is encumbered with 5% of 
tax;  
b. for an income of over IDR 50 million up to IDR 250 million per annum is 
encumbered with 15% of tax;  
c. for an income of over IDR 250 million up to IDR 500 million per annum is 
encumbered with 25% of tax; and 
d. for an income of over IDR 500 million per annum is encumbered with 30% 
of tax. 
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 See previous discussion on SJSN in The New Social Security System in the New Indonesian Republic 
section. 
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The income taxation system above applies for all kinds of income, including the receipt 
of inheritance, whereby such inheritance becomes subject to the income tax. However, 
not all inheritances are registered through the Indonesian taxation system. 
In terms of property tax, a flat rate is applied, whereby a tax object (in this case, land 
and building) is encumbered with 0.5% of tax for the value of the land and/or building. 
A flat rate is also applied for value added tax (VAT) whereby the VAT applied stands at 
10% of the value for all goods. For property of luxury goods (e.g. cars, televisions, 
musical instruments, etc.), previously a special tax is applied on top of the VAT, 
however, as of July 2015, this luxury goods tax is no longer applied. The 
‘compensation’ for the abolishment of the luxury goods tax is traded in with the 
introduction of higher import taxes, ranging up to 10% of import tax for each good. 
With the above conclusions, we can see that the economic indicators in Indonesia 
allows for the continuance of a social security system that relies on contribution paid by 
the employees. However, there is also a necessity to either shift the labour market to 
more formal labour markets which provide a more stable income, or to change the 
method of funding for the social security system. For example, if the system were to be 
changed then there is a possibility that a progressive rate of contribution can be 
introduced in order to lessen the burden on those with lower income. Another 
possibility is to increase the burden to persons with higher income, profits, higher 
values of property or are privy to inheritance. The problem with the taxation system lies 
in the lack of direct supervision to the taxpayers, which inhibits the proper analysis of 
inequality, whereby it affects the power struggles amongst the poor and the rich. 
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Table 12 – Current Labour Market Conditions in Indonesia (Urban and Rural) 
Type of Activity 
Years 
2012 2013 2014 2015 
February August February August February August February 
Population 0+ Years 244,275,026 245,987,488 247,681,962 249,372,772 251,044,249 252,711,300 254,358,118 
Population 15+ Years 175,065,229 176,873,832 178,130,470 179,967,361 181,169,972 182,992,204 184,599,615 
Economically Active 121,819,813 119,849,734 123,170,509 120,172,003 125,316,991 121,872,931 120,301,588 
 
Employed 114,061,982 112,504,868 115,929,612 112,761,072 118,169,922 114,628,026 120,846,821 
 
Unemployed 7,757,831 7,344,866 7,240,897 7,410,931 7,147,069 7,244,905 7,454,767 
Not Economically Active 53,245,416 57,024,659 54,959,961 59,795,358 55,852,981 61,119,273 56,298,027 
 
Attending School 14,774,947 14,549,659 15,328,846 14,630,852 15,899,591 16,769,494 16,514,465 
 
House Keeping 31,676,891 34,127,548 32,653,052 36,036,779 32,853,393 36,019,249 32,488,589 
 
Others 6,793,578 8,346,891 6,978,063 9,127,727 7,099,997 8,330,530 7,294,973 
Labour Force Participation Rate (%) 86.59 67.76 69.15 66.77 69.17 66.60 69.50 
Unemployment Rate (%) 6.37 6.13 5.88 6.17 5.70 5.94 5.81 
Employed with Less Working Hours 35,979,411 34,921,370 36,391,412 37,736,453 36,967,972 35,768,184 35,678,296 
 
Underemployed 14,890,145 12,738,442 13,678,497 11,000,403 10,567,016 9,680,866 10,043,945 
 Part-Time Worker 21,089,266 22,182,928 22,712,915 26,736,050 26,400,356 26,087,318 25,634,351 
Source – Badan Pusat Statistik Indonesia 2015 
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Table 13 – Working Age Population According to Industry (Urban and Rural) 
Main Industry 
Years 
2012 2013 2014 2015 
February August February August February August February 
Agriculture, Forestry, Hunting and 
Fishery 41.665.576 39.590.054 40.764.720 39.220.261 40.833.052 38.973.033 40.122.816 
Mining and Quarrying 1.615.563 1.602.706 1.558.686 1.426.454 1.623.109 1.436.370 1.420.917 
Manufacturing 14.392.751 15.615.386 14.998.937 14.959.804 15.390.188 15.254.674 16.382.756 
Electricity, Gas and Water 301.815 251.162 260.116 252.134 308.588 289.193 311.834 
Construction 6.148.016 6.851.291 6.952.928 6.349.387 7.211.967 7.280.086 7.714.384 
Wholesale, Retail, Restaurant and 
Hotels 24.312.988 23.517.145 25.270.435 24.105.906 25.809.269 24.829.734 26.647.168 
Transportation, Storage and 
Communication 5.234.636 5.052.302 5.285.277 5.096.987 5.324.105 5.113.188 5.192.181 
Financing, Insurance, Real Estate and 
Business Services 2.809.856 2.696.090 3.045.787 2.898.279 3.193.357 3.031.038 3.643.881 
Community, Social and Personal 
Services 17.580.781 17.328.732 17.792.726 18.451.860 18.476.287 18.420.710 19.410.884 
Source – Badan Pusat Statistik Indonesia 2015 
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Figure 20 – Employed Persons 15+ years according to Status of Employment (2015) 
 
Source – Badan Pusat Statistik Indonesia 2015 
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In Table 14 below, we can observe the average wage of Indonesian employees. If we 
convert using the current rate of the US$, then the national average wage in Indonesia is 
approximately US$170 per person. We can also observe that the rate is higher in the 
urban areas, with workers gaining an average of approximately US$200, whereas those 
in the rural areas receive US$130. We can also see that there is a trend in increase of 
average wage, rising approximately US$40 in the past 4 years. This is due to struggles 
made by the growing labour movements which have pressurised local governments to 
increase the minimum wage for workers.  
Table 14 – Average Wage of Employees (Monthly)   
Category 
Years 
2012 2013 2014 2015 
February August February August February August February 
National 1.582.015 1.635.965 1.667.297 1.917.152 1.885.815 1.952.589 1.981.725 
Urban 1.710.574 1.760.469 1.802.010 2.099.876 2.083.499 2.141.850 2.153.567 
Rural 1.275.658 1.335.237 1.365.464 1.473.177 1.451.969 1.514.434 1.528.212 
Source – Badan Pusat Statistik Indonesia 2015 
We can see that there is also a growing trend in the rural areas, although not as 
pronounced as those in the urban areas. This may be due to the fact that national wage 
in Indonesia is determined by the local regional governments as opposed to the central 
government. In this case, Indonesia also does not have a nationally determined 
minimum wage, hence there is also difficulty in standardising the income in national 
terms. The reason for this is that each region has their own autonomy to determine 
wages in consideration of local living standards and sources of income. However, 
minimum wage is not the focus of our discussion in this paper.   
The Indonesian economy has steadily kept its growth at approximately 5% per annum 
for the past 3 years. It was not even largely affected by the Global Financial Crisis in 
2007-2008, when the rest of the world suffered minimal or even negative growth, 
Indonesia still kept afloat with approximately 3% of growth in 2009.  
Nonetheless, we must also consider that this growth was not sufficiently distributed. 
The Indonesian Gini coefficient remained at 0.38 (not necessarily in real terms) and 
research by the ADB showed that the consumption growth mostly occurred in the 
richest quintile (see Figure 22) (ADB, 2014). This shows that although Indonesia had a 
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vast economic growth, this does not necessarily mean that the majority of its population 
had access to its benefits. 
Figure 21 – Current GDP Growth Rate (%) per Annum  
 
Source – World Development Indicators 
 
Figure 22 – Average Annualized Growth Rates in Per Capita Consumption (in 
2005 PPP$) (Developing Economies in Asia) 
 
Source: ADB Framework of Inclusive Growth Indicators (2014) 
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These elements of the economy are important to gain a notion of what possibilities are 
available in making developments in social policies in Indonesia. With this, we can 
determine whether there is a possibility of enhancing the existing welfare state in 
Indonesia. Of course, the data proves that although there is a possibility to start the 
implementation of universal social security policies, more time and economic growth, 
changes in the productive structure which increases productivity and allows the creatin 
of more and better jobs, income per capita growth, conducive power relations which are 
favourable to the labour class and poor persons, are required to build a comprehensive 
form of welfare state. 
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Conclusion 
 
The Welfare State in Indonesia 
From the discussions above, it is evident in Asian countries that there was a 
preoccupation for economic growth, above the provision of welfare
58
, and Indonesia is 
no exception to this trend. For example, it was increasingly apparent that economic 
growth was initially the main focus. This can be observed by social policies taken after 
the fall of Soeharto, which did not emphasise the inclusion of every Indonesian citizen 
in its social security regimes, neither did it pay much attention to general human rights. 
Even though the SJSN Law was promulgated in 2004, it is apparent from the lack of 
‘enthusiasm’ of the Indonesian government that universality and social protection was 
not considered as a matter of urgency, until there was pressure applied from social and 
political movements.  
When we look also to the types and models of the welfare state in the previous chapter, 
it is apparent that the Republic of Indonesia, being a country with a large population 
(approximately equal to those of Brazil), yet not such a high level of economic 
development, does not yet fit perfectly into the any of Esping-Andersen’s models. 
Although the conditions are much closer, it does not yet fit into the developmental 
welfare state when compared with the more advanced developments of Japan and 
Korea.  
As also previously mentioned, in terms of the current economic progress, Indonesia is 
swiftly growing to be one of the biggest economies in the Asia-Pacific region (see 
Figure 12). Nonetheless, Indonesia has yet to achieve a stable economy which allows 
for a fully fledged welfare state. 
However, considering the growth of the Indonesian economy, and the recent social 
policy changes under process of implementation by the Indonesian government 
(especially the implementation of the SJSN), it is clear that Indonesia is paving its way 
toward an inclusive developmental welfare state. That is, this welfare state is starting to 
focus on the inclusion of a large proportion of its people who were not previously 
included in the more selective developmental welfare state regime implemented under 
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 See The East-Asian Developmental Welfare State Models in Chapter II. 
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the Soeharto regime. Indonesia even takes the ambitious step of attempting universal 
health and social security coverage through the SJSN. 
With the rise of labour institutions, there is a strong possibility that it may spark further 
discussions regarding welfare, especially of workers. Even though there is as of yet a 
strong leftist movement to encourage this further, the climate in Indonesia is quite 
conducive to continue on their path to further developments in welfare policies. As 
evident in many other developing welfare nations such as Brazil,
59
 Japan and Korea,
60
 
strong economic growth, rapid industrialisation and urbanisation, some forms of social 
movements and democratic government systems are all required in building a welfare 
state. As we can see, these elements are present in Indonesia and thus it is not 
impossible to conclude that Indonesia is well on its way to create a more comprehensive 
welfare state in the following years. The attempts it has made now, through the SJSN, 
already proves as a good effort toward the development of the welfare state in 
Indonesia. 
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